

GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

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Globalization and Culture

Globalization lies at the heart of modern culture; cultural practices lie at the heart of globalization. This is the reciprocal relationship I shall try to establish in this chapter and explore in the chapters which follow. This is not a reckless claim: it is not to say that globalization is the single determinant of modern cultural experience, nor that culture alone is the conceptual key that unlocks globalization's inner dynamic. It is not, therefore, to claim that the politics and economics of globalization yield to a cultural account which takes conceptual precedence. But it is to maintain that the huge transformative processes of our time that globalization describes cannot be properly understood until they are grasped through the conceptual vocabulary of culture; likewise that these transformations change the very fabric of cultural experience and, indeed, affect our sense of what culture actually is in the modern world. Both globalization and culture are concepts of the highest order of generality and notoriously contested in their meanings. This book certainly does not aim at an exhaustive analysis of either: more modestly it tries to grasp the main elements of globalization in what might be called a cultural register. In this first chapter I offer an orientating understanding of the concept of globalization within this register, and then try to show why culture and globalization matter intrinsically to each other.

Globalization as Complex Connectivity

To construct this argument I begin with a simple and relatively uncontentious basic understanding of globalization as an empirical

condition of the modern world: what I shall call *complex connectivity*. By this I mean that globalization refers to the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependencies that characterize modern social life. The notion of connectivity is found in one form or another in most contemporary accounts of globalization. McGrew, to give a typical example, speaks of globalization as 'simply the intensification of global interconnectedness' and stresses the multiplicity of linkages it implies: 'Nowadays, goods, capital, people, knowledge, images, crime, pollutants, drugs, fashions and beliefs all readily flow across territorial boundaries. Transnational networks, social movements and relationships are extensive in virtually all areas from the academic to the sexual' (1992: 65, 67). An important point to draw out here is that the linkages suggested exist in a number of different *modalities*, varying from the social-institutional relationships that are proliferating between individuals and collectivities worldwide, to the idea of the increasing 'flow' of goods, information, people and practices across national borders, to the more 'concrete' modalities of connection provided by technological developments such as the international system of rapid air transport and the more literal 'wiredness' of electronic communications systems.

McGrew writes from the perspective of international politics, but similar formulations – 'interconnections', 'networks', 'flows' – can be found in sociological (Lash and Urry 1994; Castells 1996, 1997, 1998), cultural studies (Hall 1992) or anthropological accounts (Friedman 1995). What this attests to is at least a basic degree of consensus on the empirical reality that globalization refers us to. It is these multivalent connections that now bind our practices, our experiences and our political, economic and environmental fates together across the modern world. And so the broad task of globalization *theory* is both to understand the sources of this condition of complex connectivity and to interpret its implications across the various spheres of social existence.

One of the most striking features of the idea of globalization is just how readily and plentifully all manner of implications seem to flow from it. It is an extraordinarily fecund concept in its capacity to generate speculations, hypotheses and powerful social images and metaphors which reach far beyond the bare social facts. In one sense of course this can be counted to its credit, since the simple fact of increasing connectivity is limited in its interest and, without interpretation and elaboration, could remain an almost banal observation. Connectivity is thus a condition which immediately needs

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elaboration and interpretation. However there is also a danger of confusion arising from the tendency towards conceptual slippage that seems to attend the idea. Because of this, we need to exercise a degree of circumspection in the way we elaborate the core idea of connectivity. To illustrate both the need for elaboration and its pitfalls, I want to look at two ways in which the simple idea of connectivity shades into other themes.

Connectivity and Proximity

First the idea of connectivity could be taken to imply increasing global-spatial *proximity*: what Marx in the *Grundrisse* (1973a) talked of as the 'annihilation of space by time' and what David Harvey (1989) has referred to as 'time-space compression'. What is involved here is a sense of the shrinking of distances through the dramatic reduction in the time taken, either physically (for instance, via air travel) or representationally (via the transmission of electronically mediated information and images), to cross them. At another level of analysis connectivity shades into the idea of spatial proximity via the idea of the 'stretching' of social relations across distance (Giddens 1990, 1994a, b). The discourse of globalization is replete with metaphors of global proximity, of a 'shrinking world': from Marshall McLuhan's famous 'global village' to the United Nations' recent coining of the term 'Our Global Neighbourhood' to describe an emerging world-political context. All such metaphors and images derive their sense of increasing intimacy precisely out of the extension and the elaboration of different modalities of connectivity. But proximity/intimacy is not the same thing as connectivity: it is at best an elaboration, at worst a slippage.

Proximity has its own truth as a description of the condition of global modernity and this is generally of either a phenomenological or a metaphorical order. In the first case it describes a common conscious *appearance* of the world as more intimate, more compressed, more part of everyday reckoning – for example in our experience of rapid transport or our mundane use of media technologies to bring distant images into our most intimate local spaces. In the second, it conveys the increasing immediacy and consequentiality of real distanced relations metaphorically. Here the connections that affect our lives (for example, the financial networks that tie our bank accounts into the global capitalist market or shared global environmental threats like 'global warming' which we confront) are made

sense of *as though* they really bring us into closer contact. Proximity, then, takes us beyond the 'empirical' condition of connectivity. It is not that this language is misleading or invalid, but it is nevertheless important to maintain the distinction between this idea and the idea of connectivity.

For the condition of connectivity not only underwrites the notion of proximity, but places its own stamp on the way we understand global 'closeness'. Being connected means being close in very specific ways: the experience of proximity afforded by these connections coexists with an undeniable, stubbornly enduring *physical distance* between places and people in the world, which the technological and social transformations of globalization have not conjured away. In a globalized world, people in Spain really do continue to be 5,500 miles away from people in Mexico, separated, just as the Spanish conquistadores were in the sixteenth century, by a huge, inhospitable and perilous tract of ocean. What connectivity means is that we now experience this distance in different ways. We think of such distant places as routinely accessible, either representationally through communications technology or the mass media, or physically, through the expenditure of a relatively small amount of time (and, of course, of money) on a transatlantic flight. So Mexico City is no longer meaningfully 5,500 miles from Madrid: it is eleven hours' flying time away.

One way indeed of thinking about the particular sense of proximity produced by a 'technical' modality of connectivity is to consider the transformation of spatial experience into temporal experience that is characteristic of airline journeys. Planes are truly time capsules. When we board them we enter a self-contained and independent temporal regime which seems designed to remove our experience almost entirely from the business of ultra-high-speed movement through the air. The familiar sequence of take-off routine, distribution of newspapers, complimentary drinks, meals, sale of duty-free goods and in-flight movies all focus us on the internal time-frame of the cabin. So, phenomenologically, our 'journey' is one through this familiar sequence of time rather than through space. Going from London to Madrid is one mealtime; from Madrid to Mexico two mealtimes, a movie and a period of sleep. And so forth for the longer hauls. It is only when we occasionally look out of the window, perhaps to trace a coastline, that we might fleetingly grasp a sense of the vast tracts of distance that we are actually passing over. And the sense of the enormity of this space, linking quickly to discomfiting thoughts of our vulnerability, probably discourages us from

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dwelling on this external reality.¹ Much more comforting to focus on the flight data display within the cabin, constantly translating thousands of kilometres into 'hours to destination': our true lived reality. It is only very rarely indeed that the territory we fly over intrudes at all into the experience of airline travel. Perhaps the flight crew may draw our attention to some particular physical feature – 'On our left you can see Cape Cod' – but examples of any deeper sense of human territory are so rare as to appear eccentric: 'When an international flight crosses Saudi Arabia, the hostess announces that during the overflight the drinking of alcohol will be forbidden in the aircraft. This signifies the intrusion of territory into space. Land = society = nation = culture = religion: the equation of anthropological place, fleetingly inscribed in space' (Augé 1995: 116). Marc Augé interprets this as the brief intrusion of the thickness of culture into the 'non-place' of the airline's space, but we can equally see it as emblematic of the curious penetration of an enclosed journey through *time* by externalities of *space* (territory) which seem entirely remote from, indeed irrelevant to, this experience.

After a few hours of this enclosed time-journey we arrive, clear customs, walk out of the terminal building and magically 'there we are', deposited in the same clothes in which we boarded (the tangible attachments to our not-so-distant home) into a strange environment, a different climate, probably a different language, certainly a different cultural tempo. What sort of 'proximity' does such a process involve? How, precisely has the connectivity provided by air travel brought us closer? It undeniably makes distant places *accessible* without a great expense of time, energy or (relatively) money. It makes physical relocation a matter of routine – something often to be fitted into a few hours, a day or so at most. But this proximity is also surely a problematic one, born as it is out of the technologically achieved compression of space by time. For the space we traverse in these journeys through the routine sequence of 'cabin time' is not just physical distance but the social and cultural distance (Saudi Arabia = Islam = no alcohol) that 'real' material space preserves. The connectivity of air travel thus poses for us sharply the question of the overcoming of social-cultural distance.

From the suspended animation of the flight, then, we have to confront the cultural adjustment of arrival. Our experienced journey though time rather than space has not prepared us for the new reality of this place. We have not experienced the sense of the traversing of 'real' distance: the gradual changes of scene, the gradations in climate, the series of social interactions, the *longueurs*, the interruptions

and pauses, the symbolical moments of border crossings and the sheer physicality which travel in the 'real time' of, say, a railway journey affords. This compression of distance has left us temporarily dislocated and we need to adjust to a reality which is immediate and challenging in its otherness, precisely because it is so accessible. One measure of the accomplishment of globalization, then, is how far the overcoming of physical distance is matched by that of cultural distance.

There are various ways in which we can think about this. The most obvious is to ask *how* different the place of arrival actually is, in the modern world, from the place of embarkation. This is to enter the discourse of cultural homogenization. The homogenization thesis presents globalization as synchronization to the demands of a standardized consumer culture, making everywhere seem more or less the same. So to assert cultural homogenization as a consequence of globalization is to move from connectivity through proximity to the supposition of global uniformity and ubiquity. As I shall argue in chapter 3, this is a precipitate and in many ways an unjustifiable movement. However, we can see how it has a certain plausibility, particularly when thought through in relation to the example of air travel. For there is no denying the similarity between air terminals worldwide. The exits and entrances to different cultural spaces are, as has often been remarked, curiously uniform and standardized. However, this observation may be of limited significance, since airports are pretty clearly special kinds of places defined by the functional demands of their business, which is precisely to minimize cultural difference in the interests of a functional commonality, smoothing the passage of international travellers. To decide whether the homogenization thesis really obtains you have to venture outside the security of the terminal and get progressively deeper into the dangerous cultural hinterland. This may be something that theorists are unwilling to do. For the encounter with the messiness and particularity of actual cultural practices is of course dangerous for theories – like the homogenization thesis – established at the distance of broad abstraction. Noting different disciplinary tendencies towards progressive levels of theoretical abstraction, Néstor García Canclini wryly observes that 'The anthropologist arrives in the city on foot, the sociologist by car and via the main highway, the communications specialist by plane' (1995: 4). The assertion of global homogenization of culture is a little like arriving by plane but never leaving the terminal, spending all one's time browsing amongst the global brands of the duty-free shops.

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So, leaving aside the suppositions of broad cultural homogenization for the present, let us pursue the idea of the relation between connectivity and cultural proximity by thinking about the process of adjustment that occurs outside the airline terminal. The accomplishment of globalization appears here as a function of the ease with which this adjustment can be made. And this reveals some of the intrinsic 'unevenness' of globalization. At one end of a continuum of experience we might find the accomplished business-class passenger who displays his (mostly, 'his') credentials with the insouciance with which he enacts the social-cultural adjustments of arrival: the swift location of the taxi, the easy transit to the pre-booked international hotel whilst gradually, comfortably, absorbing the changed scene, the assurance of finding all the facilities – faxes, CNN business news, international cuisine – that will allow him to function independently of context. For the orientation of business travel is actually to *minimize* cultural difference so as to allow the 'universal' practices of the international business culture to function smoothly. This is connectivity working functionally to achieve a manufactured form of 'proximity' experienced as universality. Distant places are culturally close for business executives because they are carefully negotiated according to the business in hand: international standardization in the hotel and the board room, enhanced, perhaps, by some local colour in the evening's entertainment.

From the instrumental point of view of capitalism, then, connectivity works towards increasing a *functional* proximity. It doesn't make all places the same, but it creates globalized spaces and connecting corridors which ease the flow of capital (including its commodities and its personnel) by matching the time-space compression of connectivity with a degree of cultural 'compression'. This is certainly an important dimension of globalization. But it does not grasp the whole picture, and risks exaggerating the shading of connectivity into cultural proximity. What the business-class traveller does not typically experience is the fine grain of everyday cultural practices defined by *locality* rather than globality and maintaining cultural difference in the face of encroaching connectivity. This culture does not reveal itself in five-star international hotels, but in the streets, the houses, the churches, the workplaces, the bars and the shops that lie beyond the business or tourist centres.

Such 'localities' are quite simply the places where people live their everyday lives: the day-to-day environments of 'home'. For some they may exist pressed hard up against the perimeter fence of the airfield and yet they are part of an entirely different cultural 'world'

from that of the connectivity of air travel. And they are clearly not governed by the same immediate demands of an instrumental connectivity and standardization that organize international business culture. Entering such environments means entering the order of social life which feels the sway of local affairs more than the demands of globality, and which exhibits the particularity – the cultural difference – of 'locality'. When discussions of globalization raise (as most do) the 'global-local' relationship, this is the vast order of everyday life that they invoke.

Few business travellers stray into these environments (until, of course, they are returned to their own comfortable localities). So this level of cultural difference is often invisible when viewed from the perspective of the smooth-functioning globalization of capital. It is more likely to be encountered by less well-organized or resourced travellers: by labour migrants or perhaps by independent tourists on a low budget. In the global space of the terminal such people may appear less accomplished in the rituals of arrival, but their lack of resources means that they quickly penetrate deeper into the culture of locality: the bus rather than the taxi, a basic hotel in a working-class neighbourhood lacking the cultural 'insulation' provided by five-star status, the need to shop in cheap local stores. These travellers quickly become more accomplished hermeneuticians, testing out the real extents of cultural proximity outside of the enclaves of a global business culture. The journey into localities then is a journey into the challenging reality of cultural difference, posing the question of how far connectivity establishes 'proximity' beyond the technological modality of increasing access.

At this point we have to move beyond the example of air travel. Tracing the phenomenology of this modality of connectivity pushes us towards a 'high-profile' understanding of globalization which is seductive but restricted in its application. Jet travel is an intrinsic part of connectivity and, in its increasing commonplace integration into everyday life, demands attention as cultural experience. But obviously it reveals only one aspect of what connectivity implies. First because, despite its increasing ubiquity,² it is still restricted to *relatively* small numbers of people and, within this group, to an even smaller, more exclusive, cadre of frequent users. Many people in the most developed countries of the world have never been on an aeroplane, and this obviously applies to many millions in less developed countries. Air travel, like the use of the internet, could thus be seen as merely the globalization available to the affluent. And if this were so, it would lose much of its claim to be a *general* condition of our

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time. But, more significantly, the sense of global connectivity implied by this sort of high-profile globalizing technology pushes, as we have seen, towards a particular and exaggerated sense of proximity.

If connectivity really does imply proximity as a *general* social-cultural condition, this has to be understood in terms of a transformation of practice and experience which is felt *actually within localities* as much as in the increasing technological means of access to or egress from them. Lash and Urry (1994: 252) suggest that 'modern society is society on the move', and that 'the modern world is inconceivable without . . . new forms of long-distance transportation and travel.' I don't want to disagree with this, but I think it is also important not to exaggerate the way long-distance travel figures either in the lives of the majority of people in the world today or in the overall process of globalization. 'Local life' – contrasted here with the transient 'global life' of the space of the air terminal (or indeed the computer terminal) – is the vast order of human social existence which continues, because of the constraints of physical embodiment, to dominate even in a globalized world. Local life occupies the majority of time and space. Although the increasing ability to move – physically and representationally – between places is a highly significant mode of connectivity, it is ultimately subordinate to – indeed derivative of – the order of location in time and space which we grasp as 'home'. Globalization *is* transforming this local order, but the significance of this transformation reaches beyond the technological accomplishments of communications and transport. Putting it simply, connectivity means changing the nature of localities and not just occasionally lifting some people out of them. So I think a statement like 'the paradigmatic modern experience is that of rapid mobility over long distances' (Lash and Urry 1994: 253) needs to be treated with some caution. It might be nearer the mark to say that the paradigmatic experience of global modernity for most people – and this is not of course unrelated to the correlation between income and mobility – is that of staying in one place but experiencing the 'dis-placement' that global modernity *brings to them*.

To understand globalization in this way is to pay attention to the other modalities of connectivity that we have mentioned. In particular it is to grasp the 'proximity' that comes from the networking of social relations across large tracts of time-space, causing distant events and powers to penetrate our local experience. It is to understand how someone may face unemployment as a result of 'downsizing' decisions made at a company head office on another continent, or

how the food we find in our supermarkets is radically different today from twenty years ago because of the complex interaction between cosmopolitan taste and the global economics of the food industry, or of how our very sense of cultural belonging – of being 'at home' – may be subtly transfigured by the penetration of globalizing media into our everyday lives. It is these sorts of transformation that I shall mainly be concerned with in the chapters that follow.

Connectivity and Global Unicity

But now I want to turn, briefly, to another significant elaboration/slippage from the core idea of connectivity. This is the idea that connectivity is globally encompassing and thus implies a certain 'unicity': a sense that the world is becoming, for the first time in history, a single social and cultural setting. Whereas it was in the past possible to understand social and cultural processes and practices as a set of local, relatively 'independent' phenomena, globalization makes the world a 'single place'. Obvious examples of this are the way in which the economic affairs of nation-states are locked into a global capitalist economy, or how the environmental effects of local industrial processes can rapidly become global problems.

In a strict sense, however, the idea of the world becoming one place is only contingently related to the idea of increasing connectivity. Although it is plausible to speculate that the rapid development of networks of interconnection will eventually encompass all of human society, this is by no means a logical entailment of the idea. Despite its reach, few would dare to claim that the complex connectivity of globalization currently extends in any profound way to every single person or place on the planet, and speculation on its spread must surely be tempered by the many countervailing trends towards social and cultural division that we see around us.

Nevertheless we also have to recognize a certain pull in the direction of the 'unitary' both in the concept of globalization and in the empirical processes it describes. The term 'global' itself has powerful connotations of wholeness and inclusiveness deriving both from its metaphorical usage (global as 'total') and from the sheer semantics of geometric form: for example in the connection of terms like 'encompassing' with the spherical form of the earth. Globalization as a concept, then, surely has a connotational force of 'tending towards unicity', and if the empirical state of connectivity we have identified has no such implications, then it simply looks as though,

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with 'globalization', we have all somehow got hold of the wrong word! What we require is a way of thinking through the implications of unicity that doesn't fetch up in more controversial slippages: unicity's shading into either 'uniformity' or 'unity'.

Roland Robertson's extensive work on globalization has centred on these problems and he offers a sophisticated formulation of the idea of 'the compression of the world into a "single place"' (1992: 6). Whilst maintaining that, 'the trends towards the unicity of the world are, when all is said and done, inexorable' (1992: 26), Robertson provides a model which disarms some of the immediate criticisms that such a view might attract. In essence Robertson's sense of global unicity is of a *context* which increasingly determines social relations and simultaneously of a *frame of reference* within which social agents increasingly figure their existence, identities and actions. For Robertson, then, global unicity does not imply a simplistic uniformity – something like a 'world culture'. Rather, it is a complex social and phenomenological condition – the 'global-human condition' – in which different orders of human life are brought into articulation with one another. He identifies four such orders: individual human beings, national societies, the 'world system of societies' and the overarching collectivity of 'humankind'. Globalization, for him, is the increasing interaction between these orders of human life, and so 'the world as a single place' implies the transformation of these forms of life as they are increasingly positioned against, and forced to take account of, each other. This is neither the unicity of homogenization nor a naive sense of emergent global (comm)unity. Indeed, far from suggesting an unproblematic process of integration, Robertson's model of unicity is one in which social and cultural difference may become accentuated precisely as it is identified in relation to the 'world as a whole'.

As an example, we can consider how Robertson's approach copes with the obvious objection to the broad idea of global unicity: the many counter-instances of fragmentation in the modern world – racial and ethnic hostilities, economic protectionism, religious fundamentalism and so on. Robertson's response is to point to a significant aspect of these counter-instances: the fact that they are 'reflexively monitored'. Taking the example of contemporary economic protectionism he argues that

Compared to the older protectionisms and autarkies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ... the new ones are more self-consciously situated within a globewide system of global rules and regulations

concerning economic trade and a consciousness of the global economy as a whole. This certainly does not mean that protectionism will be overcome by such factors, but it does mean that relevant parties, including 'average citizens', are increasingly constrained to think in terms, not necessarily favourable terms, of the world as a whole. (Robertson 1992: 26)

For Robertson, then, the structures of global connectivity combine with a pervasive *awareness* of this situation to raise any local events inevitably to the horizon of a single world. A similar case might be made for the 'cultural protectionism' implicit in religious fundamentalism, which may be read as a *self-conscious* defence of 'traditional' beliefs, values and practices precisely defined by the undermining of tradition threatened by global compression.

One of the great strengths of Robertson's approach is in providing a conceptual framework which preserves the important sense of globalization as involving wholeness and inclusiveness – as context – whilst allowing it to cope with the empirical complexities of a world which seems to display simultaneous processes of integration and differentiation. The sort of world in which the technological connectivity of the internet can be used – as in the current proliferation of 'sectarian' websites – for the aggressive assertion of ethnic, religious or racial differences. So I think Robertson is basically correct to see globalization in terms of an underlying unicity. This is not just because of the sophistication of his model, but because there is also an urgent political need to retain the idea. As connectivity reaches into localities, it transforms local lived experience but it also confronts people with a world in which their fates undeniably *are* bound together in a single global frame. This is clear in terms of the economic integrations of the global market or of global environmental risk which, as Ulrich Beck (1992: 47) puts it, 'makes the utopia of a world society a little more real or at least more urgent'. Connectivity thus supposes unicity as a cultural-political principle. Local experience has to be raised to the horizon of a 'single world' if we are to understand it, and local practices and lifestyles increasingly need to be examined and evaluated in terms of their global consequences.

Culture as a Dimension of Globalization

Most of the foregoing discussion has been within a broadly cultural 'register', distinguishable in its vocabulary and its stress from that

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of, say, economics or politics. But how precisely should we think of culture as a concept and an entity in relation to globalization? One common answer is to see it as a 'dimension' of globalization. Globalization is now widely regarded as a 'multidimensional' phenomenon – on the surface an unproblematic description but, taken seriously enough, one with demanding implications for (not least, cultural) analysis.

The Multidimensionality of Globalization

Multidimensionality is closely related to the idea of complex connectivity. For the complexity of the linkages established by globalization extends to phenomena which social scientists have laboured to separate out into the categories into which we now, familiarly, break down human life: the economic, the political, the social, the interpersonal, the technological, the environmental, the cultural and so forth. Globalization arguably confounds such taxonomy.

Take the example of an environmental issue like ozone depletion caused by the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in aerosol sprays or refrigerators. The recognition of the effects of these chemicals on the earth's protective ozone layer established a prime example of a global problem, one involving, as Steven Yearley says, the 'compression of the globe'. This in the sense that some of the main (if unknowing) culprits – deodorant users and furniture polish sprayers in the dense centres of population of the developed world – were producing pollution which could 'despoil the environment of [their] neighbours, thousands of kilometres away on the planet' – most intensely at the polar regions (Yearley 1996: 27). The CFC problem is certainly one of connectivity in this direct geographical sense. But it is also one which, in its complex ramifications, links together a number of interpretative discourses. It is obviously a technological matter for which a technical 'solution' in the form of alternative chemical propellants was quickly developed. But the adoption of this technical solution raised a whole raft of international political issues in the attempt to achieve a treaty on the regulation of CFC use: the 1987 'Montreal Protocol'. During these negotiations differences emerged between the economic interests of CFC-producing nations and those that were only consumers of the products. These problems were amplified in the case of 'First World' as opposed to 'Third World' interests,³ where universal compliance raised the vexed question of economic assistance from the developed world as an incentive for poor countries such as India to

make the transition to non-CFC technologies (Yearley 1996: 107ff). The CFC issue thus linked together political, legal, scientific, environmental-ethical and economic discourses. And there are several senses in which it was also a deeply cultural issue: for example the change in cultural sensibility ('green thinking') it involved as people began to link mundane aspects of their lifestyle with global consequences, or the change in cultural practices it produced as sunbathing suddenly became a matter of risk, linked with the danger of cancer, one of the great symbolic fears of the developed world.

Examples like this demonstrate that globalizing phenomena are, of their essence, complex and multidimensional, putting pressure on the conceptual frameworks by which we have traditionally grasped the social world. However, given both the difficulty of accounting simultaneously for all the aspects of such phenomena and the power of academic disciplines in the organization of knowledge, it is not surprising that attempts persist to account for globalization in 'one-dimensional' terms. People come to the issue from different traditions of thought and with different priorities and informing principles and these, understandably, tug back from complexity to the relative 'simplicity' of master concepts such as capitalism, the nation-state and so on. But if we take multidimensionality seriously, such accounts are bound to misrepresent globalization: lose the complexity and you have lost the phenomenon.

To illustrate this we can briefly consider two approaches, very different in their analysis and their politics, but twinned in terms of their conceptualization of globalization within the single domain of the economic – as a phenomenon of the capitalist market.

The first of these is drawn from the literature of corporate business strategy. One of the most prolific writers in this mould, the Japanese business strategist Kenichi Ohmae argues that the nation-state is becoming irrelevant seen from the point of view of the capitalist market. He claims that 'traditional nation states have become unnatural, even impossible, business units in a global economy.' Rather, he argues, we should think of a world of regional economies 'where the real work gets done and the real markets flourish': 'What defines [these] is not the location of their political borders but the fact that they are the right size and scale to be the true natural business units in today's global economy. Theirs are the borders – and the connections – that matter in a borderless world' (Ohmae 1995: 5).

The tendency to see the world simply as a business opportunity is unsurprising within this discourse. On this reading, people like Ohmae are just understanding the idea of globalization within their

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own discursive universe – a coherent, albeit a rather impoverished and instrumental one. But it is not quite so self-contained as this, for this discourse inevitably spills over into other realms. Not only does Ohmae obviously make claims about the political sphere of the nation-state system which are highly controversial (Anderson 1995; McGrew and Lewis 1992; Cerny 1996), he also intervenes in a cultural discourse. For example, he argues that the global market is producing, 'a cross-border civilization'. This is based in the (predictable) claim about 'convergence of consumer tastes and preferences': 'Global brands of blue jeans, colas, and stylish athletic shoes' (1995: 29). But he goes further than this simple consumption-convergence thesis, to argue that more profound cultural/generational cleavages are occurring, for instance in Japanese society, as the 'Nintendo kids' – Japanese teenagers of the 1990s – have learned a different set of perceptions and social values from those of their parents and grandparents. This generation he argues is much less accepting of traditional Japanese notions of authority and conformity, much more culturally open, questioning and creative: 'Everything can be explored...rearranged...reprogrammed... Everything, finally, is open to considered choice, initiative, creativity – and daring' (p. 36). This shift derives, Ohmae claims, from the technological modality of connectivity: the use of computers, computer games and interactive multimedia: 'watching how a kid from another culture whom you've never seen before reveals character and mind-set through programming style' (p. 37).

The sort of cultural inferences Ohmae draws are deeply coloured by the unidimensionality of his framework. The emergent values he recognizes in Japanese kids are pretty plainly those of enterprise capitalism, and he paints a predictably Panglossian picture of 'the new melting pot of today's cross-border civilization' (p. 39). But the fault here is not just ideological: it involves sociological reductionism and mono-causal logics precisely characterizing a one-dimensional approach.

Some of the sharpest criticism of Ohmae and the position he represents comes in Hirst and Thompson's sceptical analysis of the thesis of economic globalization, *Globalization in Question* (1996). Hirst and Thompson specifically challenge the connected ideas of the transnationalization of the economy and the redundancy of the nation-state, as conceived in 'extreme globalization theorists like Ohmae' (1996: 185). Without examining the details of their critique, we can notice the self-consciously narrow terms within which it is constructed. Hirst and Thompson are *principled* one-dimensional

analysts, deliberately defining globalization as a function of economics.

In arguing that the economic globalization which thinkers like Ohmae present 'is largely a myth' (1996: 2),⁴ Hirst and Thompson are extremely careful to point out the limits of their critique. They recognize the 'vast and diverse' literature on globalization and the different understandings of the process in different disciplinary contexts. But despite this, they claim that a critique of the economic dimension is also fatal for all other understandings: '[W]e believe that without the notion of a truly globalized economy many of the other consequences adduced in the domains of culture and politics would either cease to be sustainable or become less threatening' (p. 3). But this is clearly to fall towards a reductionism in which the economy drives all else before it. Hirst and Thompson pay lip service to the idea that globalization is multiform, but then ignore any of the implications of this, on the assumption that the whole edifice of globalization theory is built upon the 'untenable assumptions' of the sort of economic position they criticize.

And, in fact, the failure to pursue the multidimensional nature of globalization has direct consequences for some of their claims about its 'mythical' nature. For they go on to argue, very properly, that accepting hyperbolic claims about global capitalist power can be politically disabling: 'One can only call the political impact of "globalization" the pathology of over-diminished expectations . . . we have a myth which exaggerates the degree of our helplessness in the face of contemporary economic forces' (1996: 6). Now such arguments have considerable force when directed at the rhetoric of globalization which views it simply as the untrammelled power of transnational capitalism. But to accept the *definition* of globalization in these narrow economic terms is to share the one-dimensionality of the positions they criticize. For if globalization is understood in terms of simultaneous, complexly related processes in the realms of economy, politics, culture, technology and so forth, we can see that it involves all sorts of contradictions, resistances and countervailing forces. Indeed the understanding of globalization as involving a 'dialectic' of opposed principles and tendencies – the local and the global, universalism and particularism – is now common, particularly in accounts which foreground cultural issues (Axford 1995; Featherstone 1995; Giddens 1990; Hall 1992; Lash and Urry 1994; Robertson 1995; Sreberny-Mohammadi 1991). None of this is to diminish the importance of the economic in the process of globalization. The dynamics of capitalism in each of its moments of the

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production, circulation and consumption of commodities is heavy with implications for our increasing interconnectedness. However this does not mean that the economic analysis of transnational capitalism is the royal road to grasping globalization.

But if we insist on the complexly related multidimensionality of globalization, what does this imply for a 'cultural approach'?

The Cultural Dimension

Taking multidimensionality seriously can actually be *too* demanding. The sheer scale and complexity of the empirical reality of global connectivity is something which defies attempts to encompass it: it is something we can only grasp by cutting into it in various ways. What this suggests is that we are pretty much bound to lose *some* of the complexity of globalization in any feasible account of it, but it doesn't follow that an account of one dimension – one way of slicing into globalization – has to be a 'one-dimensional' account. For there are better and worse ways of doing this.

A bad way would be to start from the premise that the dimension under consideration is the master discourse, the domain that 'things really all boil down to', the logic that unlocks all else. A better way would be to identify the specific way of describing the world that is contained within an economic, a political or a cultural discourse, and to try to draw out an understanding of globalization within these terms, whilst always denying them conceptual priority: pursuing one dimension in the self-conscious recognition of multidimensionality. This sort of deliberately anti-reductionist analysis should also make us sensitive to the points at which different dimensions interconnect and interact.

So it must be for cultural analysis. Particularly so since the concept of culture is so 'encompassing' that it can easily be taken as the ultimate level of analysis – isn't everything in the end 'cultural'? Well, no. Or, at least it gets us nowhere to think of culture in this way, as simply a description of a 'total way of life'. For, as Clifford Geertz once memorably described it (Geertz 1973: 4), this leads to '*pot-au-feu*' theorizing – the throwing of anything and everything into the conceptual stew that is the 'complex whole' of human existence.

The dimension of culture has to be made more specific, and yet this has proved difficult to achieve, since culture is anyway such a complex and elusive idea (Williams 1981; Clifford 1988; Thompson 1990; Tomlinson 1991; McGuigan 1992). I do not, however, intend to

dwell here on problems of definition. There are some fairly widely accepted features of 'the cultural' which we can build upon to get a reasonable sense of what properly belongs to the cultural dimension of globalization.

In the first place culture can be understood as the order of life in which human beings construct meaning through practices of symbolic representation. If this sounds a rather dry generalization, it nevertheless allows us to make some useful distinctions. Very broadly, if we are talking about the economic we are concerned with practices by which humans produce, exchange and consume material goods; if we are discussing the political we mean practices by which power is concentrated, distributed and deployed in societies; and if we are talking culture, we mean the ways in which people make their lives, individually and collectively, meaningful by communicating with each other.

The important thing is that to grasp these as 'dimensions' of social life is not to see them as entirely *discrete* spheres of activity: people don't turn from 'doing the economic' to 'doing the cultural' in the way that we might imagine them ending work for the day and turning to leisure activities. If this were so then we would have to suppose that no one ever derived any meaning from the activities by which they earned a living. And yet this way of thinking is quite deeply engrained in common-sense views of culture referring to the practices and products of art, literature, music, film and so on.⁵ These are all important *forms* in which specific meanings are generated, but they will not do to define, exclusively, the cultural dimension.

Rather, we have to unravel from the complexly intertwined practices of the cultural, the economic and the political, a sense of the *purpose* of the cultural – that of making life meaningful. Now everything that is symbolizable is, in a broad sense, meaningful. There are, for example, vast amounts of symbolizations attaching to economic practices, for instance the technical language of the production process (such as the specifications of a car engine) or of the market-place (such as the daily announcement of share prices). But such symbolizations do not, for me, press to the heart of the 'cultural', and I am happy to cede most of this area of *instrumental symbolization* to the domains of the economic, the technical and so on.

On the other hand, many of the symbolic representations found in marketing, whilst having ultimately an instrumental (economic) end, are, for my purposes, very properly cultural. Advertising texts, for instance, though part of what Horkheimer and Adorno (1979) referred to disparagingly as the 'culture industry' linked to the

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instrumental purposes of capitalism, remain significant cultural texts. The way people make use of advertising texts may often be similar to the way they use novels or films. This is because they offer narratives (however ideologically suspect) of how life may be lived, references to shared notions of identity, appeals to self-image, pictures of 'ideal' human relations, versions of human fulfilment, happiness and so on.

This is the sense of the cultural dimension that I want to stress, with the emphasis on meanings as ends in themselves, as distinct from simply instrumental meanings. To use a slightly high-blown formulation we could think of culture in this sense as the realm of 'existentially significant' meaning. By this I don't mean to emphasize the 'problem of existence' as formulated either in the ontological anxieties of existentialist philosophy, or yet in the range of formal religious responses to the human condition. However important these may be for the way many people interpret their lives – and notwithstanding the significance of globalization for religious institutions (Beyer 1994) – these are, as it were, too specialized existential discourses to grasp what I am after in the idea of existentially significant meaning. We have to add to this Raymond Williams's famous dictum that 'culture is ordinary' (Williams 1989; McGuigan 1992). Williams first used this phrase of course in opposition to the elite sense of culture as a rarefied 'special' form of life available only to the few through the 'cultivation' of certain sensibilities. Culture is ordinary, then, in the 'democratic anthropological' sense that it describes 'a whole way of life': it is not the exclusive property of the privileged, but inclusive of all manner of everyday practices. But for Williams this sense coexisted, importantly, with a sense of culture as providing 'personal meanings': 'The questions I ask about our culture are questions about our general and common purposes, yet also questions about deep personal meanings. Culture is ordinary, in every society and in every mind' (Williams 1989: 4).

The principle that 'culture is ordinary' makes what I am calling questions of existential significance matters that every human being routinely addresses in their everyday practices and experiences. It is not a question of some symbolic practices being more 'edifying' than others, getting closer to the quick of the human situation, being more concerned with the big questions of life. Nor is it a question of cultural or aesthetic *value* in relation to particular cultural 'texts'. The Tao-te-Ching, the late quartets of Beethoven, Picasso's *Guernica*, or Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs are no more and no less 'cultural texts' than *NYPD Blue*, a Spice Girls album, the media

coverage of the death of Princess Diana, football 'fanzines' and the latest Levis advert. All qualify to the extent that people draw upon them in making sense of their existence. And, indeed, we have to include on this reading of culture all sorts of practices which do not directly hinge on a relationship between a 'reader' and a 'text': the trip around the local supermarket aisles, or to the restaurant, the sports hall, the dance club or the garden centre, the conversation in the bar or on the street corner. Culture for my purposes refers to all these mundane practices that directly contribute to people's ongoing 'life-narratives': the stories by which we, chronically, interpret our existence in what Heidegger calls the 'thrownness' of the human situation.

When we slice into complex connectivity from this perspective, what we are concerned with is how globalization alters the context of meaning construction: how it affects people's sense of identity, the experience of place and of the self in relation to place, how it impacts on the shared understandings, values, desires, myths, hopes and fears that have developed around locally situated life. The cultural dimension therefore spans what Anthony Giddens has called both the 'out-thereness' and the 'in-hereness' of globalization: the connection between vast systemic transformations, and transformations in our most local and intimate 'worlds' of everyday experience (Giddens 1994b: 95).

Culture Distinguished from its Technologies

One particular reason for stressing this understanding of the cultural dimension is that discussions of globalization often take 'culture' to mean something rather different, eliding it with the globalizing communications and media *technologies* via which cultural representations are transmitted. This tendency is perhaps most evident in the widely distributed 'journalistic' discourse on globalization which often seems obsessed with the 'Gee-Whizzery' of new communications technologies: the internet, the global information superhighway and so on. Now though communication technologies are absolutely central to the globalization process, their development is clearly not *identical* with cultural globalization. In fact their impact has both broader and narrower implications. Broader because they have a significant role – as technology itself and, thus, in my sense, as transmitters of *instrumental* symbolizations – in *all* the dimensions in which globalization proceeds. An example of this is in the increas-

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ing integration of global news-gathering practices and the provision of market intelligence in global economic trading. But they are narrower because the media form only part of the total process by which symbolic meaning construction proceeds and only one of the forms in which globalization is experienced culturally. The mass media and other forms of mediated communication are increasingly significant in our daily lives, but they are not the only source of a globalized cultural experience. And, equally, not everything that can be said about the globalization of media and communications systems is directly relevant to discussions of culture.

An example of the conflation of culture and its technologies is, rather surprisingly, found in the otherwise sophisticated account of globalization provided by Anthony Giddens. Towards the end of a long discussion of the institutional dimensions of globalization, Giddens mentions, '... a further and quite fundamental aspect of globalization, which lies behind each of the various institutional dimensions ... and which might be referred to as cultural globalization' (1990: 77). But the reader looking for an account of culture as meaning construction will be disappointed: what Giddens discusses is how 'mechanized technologies of communication have dramatically influenced all aspects of globalization'. He stresses the importance of pooled information in the global extension of the institutions of modernity and, significantly, takes the 'instrumental' context of global money markets as his prime example. This, and the fact that his discussion of 'culture' (scarcely one page) is tucked away at the end of a long discussion of industrialism, suggests an interest in the 'disembedding' properties of technologies of communication rather than in culture in our sense of the social production of existentially significant meaning.

It is fair to say that Giddens has not paid all that much attention to the *concept* of culture in his work on globalization, and this may account for this rather offhand conflation of culture with communication technologies. And, to be fair, there are many other points in his discussion, which we shall come to in the following chapter, that suggest, albeit indirectly, a more nuanced view of the cultural. But what this example illustrates is the importance of tying down quite firmly the rather elastic and accommodating concept of 'culture' in relation to globalization. I certainly agree with Giddens that the cultural dimension is 'fundamental' to globalization, but I want to understand this in much broader terms than those available simply from the analysis of the impact of communications technologies – however significant these may be for the institutional and systemic

connectivity of our world. And now I shall try to suggest how this may be done.

Why Culture Matters for Globalization

Culture matters for globalization in the obvious sense that it is an intrinsic aspect of the whole process of complex connectivity. But we can go further than this. We can try to understand the sense in which culture is actually *constitutive* of complex connectivity. Again there are better and worse ways of going about this.

One obvious hazard is to fall into arguments that assert a degree of causal priority to culture, privileging this dimension in just the same way we saw Hirst and Thompson do for the economy. An example of this is found in Malcolm Waters's account in which, having set up the standard economy/polity/culture distinction in terms, respectively, of sets of material, political and symbolic exchange relations, he goes on to claim, somewhat provocatively, that

material exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; and symbolic exchanges globalize. It follows that the globalization of human society is contingent on the extent to which cultural relations are effective relative to economic and political arrangements. We can expect the economy and the polity to be globalized to the extent that they are culturalized, that is to the extent that the exchanges that take place within them are accomplished symbolically. We would also expect that the degree of globalization is greater in the cultural arena than either of the other two. (Waters 1995: 9–10 – emphasis in original)

Waters's justification for so privileging the cultural is, briefly, that the nature of symbolic exchanges means they are inherently less limited by the constraints of place than either material (economic) or political exchanges. He argues, for example, that material exchanges are 'rooted in localized markets, factories, offices and shops', simply because of the practical necessity or the cost advantage of physical proximity in the production and exchange of goods and services. In contrast to these constraints which 'tend to tie economic exchanges to localities', cultural symbols 'can be produced anywhere and at any time and there are relatively few resource constraints on their production and reproduction' (Waters 1995: 9). Culture is thus intrinsically more globalizing on account of the ease of the 'stretching' of the relations involved and the inherent mobility of cultural forms and products.

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This is scarcely a convincing argument. For clearly there are all sorts of examples – the impact of multinational corporations, the international division of labour (involved for example in the production of automobiles or in the clothing industry), the increasing phenomenon of labour migration, financial and commodity trading, the significance of international trading regulatory agreements and bodies such as the GATT and now the World Trade Organization – that testify to the globalization of the ‘material exchanges’ involved in economic relations. Obviously there are lots of instances in which the production, exchange and consumption of commodities *do* remain relatively local activities, but a trip around the neighbourhood mall will quickly reveal how much is not local produce. It is of course true that all production has to be situated *somewhere* in the world. But as celebrated examples such as the intensive production of mange-tout peas in countries like Zimbabwe exclusively for the European market, or the journey of Australian parsnips 17,000 miles to the UK to provide year-round availability show, this is no real inhibitant to the globalization process. Equally the idea that symbolic exchanges float free of material constraints might suggest a strangely ‘idealist’ view – for don’t symbolizations ultimately have to take material form – as books, CDs, celluloid, electron flows on to TV screens and VDUs and so forth? Although, obviously, electronically mediated ‘products’ are technically much more mobile, all the material production processes related to these various cultural forms surely suppose similar constraints to those involved in any other form of commodity production.

Such objections cast doubt on the plausibility of Waters’s rather swashbuckling generalizations about the localizing and globalizing properties of various social spheres.⁶ But on closer examination, what he turns out to be arguing is anyway something rather more modest: simply that those sectors of the economy that are most symbolically mediated or as he puts it ‘tokenized’ – for example financial markets – are the ones most amenable to globalization. This is a far more plausible claim, for clearly the movement of symbolic tokens like money by electronic means is far easier than the movement of large quantities of root vegetables.

But does this in any way support the claim of culture to predominance in the globalization process? I don’t think so. Not, at least, in our preferred sense. For Waters is using culture here with the stress firmly on *instrumental symbolization* rather than on existentially significant meaning construction, and so trading on the elision warned against earlier. We can quite agree that some economic processes are

becoming more 'tokenized' but this simply means they are more *informationalized* – the symbolizations employed are intrinsic to the economic process – not that they are 'culturalized'. To be more culturalized would mean that the processes and practices by which people furnish for themselves meaningful accounts of their social existence are becoming somehow more closely articulated with the economic sphere. This may in fact be so, but the argument needs to be based in something other than problematic claims about the 'dematerialized' nature of symbolic goods. Waters, then, may turn out to be right about the overall significance of culture in globalization, but for the wrong reasons.

The problem of understanding culture as constitutive of globalization turns on how we conceive of culture as having consequences. 'Culture is not a power, something to which social events can be causally attributed', says Clifford Geertz, and this is surely right to the extent that we should think of cultural processes as the construction of meanings, in Geertz's terms, as 'a context in which [events] can be intelligibly . . . described' (Geertz 1973: 14). To think in directly 'causal' terms pushes us towards the confusion of culture with its technologies. However this does not mean that culture is not *consequential*. It is certainly so in that meaning construction informs individual and collective actions which are *themselves* consequential. People do not produce meanings within some entirely separate interpretative channel which, as it were, runs parallel with other social practices but leaves them untouched. Cultural signification and interpretation constantly orientates people, individually and collectively, towards particular actions. Often our actions may be fairly instrumental ones, following a logic of practical or economic necessity, but even here they are undertaken within the 'context' of a broader cultural understanding. Even the most basic instrumental actions of satisfying bodily needs are not in this sense outside culture: in certain circumstances (slimming, religious fasting, hunger strikes) the decision to eat or to starve is a cultural decision.

One way to think about the consequentiality of culture for globalization, then, is to grasp how culturally informed 'local' actions can have globalizing consequences. Complex connectivity is not just the tighter integration of social institutions, but involves the integration of individual and collective actions into the way that institutions actually work. Thus cultural connectivity introduces the idea of the *reflexivity* of global-modern life.

The central insight of theories of reflexivity (Beck 1997; Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994; Giddens 1990) is the *recursive* nature of

social activity: the various ways in which social entities may be said to act 'back upon' themselves, to adjust to incoming information about their behaviour or their workings. The idea builds upon the inherent reflexivity of human beings: the capacity we all have to be constantly aware of ourselves *as acting* in the process of acting, to 'routinely "keep in touch" with the grounds of what [we] do as an integral element of doing it' (Giddens 1990: 36). Social theories of reflexivity attempt to articulate how this sort of self-monitoring manifests itself at the level of social institutions, or rather the interface between social agents and institutions. In Giddens's account, this occurs in the phenomenon of 'institutional reflexivity': modern institutions are ones in which 'social practices are constantly examined and reformulated in the light of incoming information about those practices, thus constitutively altering their character' (Giddens 1990: 38). Modern institutions are thus increasingly, like human beings, 'learning entities'. It is this reflexive sensitivity of institutions in relation to inputs from human agents that marks the peculiar dynamism of modern social life and that defines the connectivity between a multiplicity of small individual local actions and the highest-level global structures and processes.

To illustrate this we can consider a claim that Giddens makes in relation to the 'local-global dialectic'. He writes that 'local lifestyle habits have become globally consequential. Thus my decision to buy a certain item of clothing has implications not only for the international division of labour but for the earth's ecosystems' (Giddens 1994a: 5). How might this be true? Well, first, in the sense that the global clothing industry is a highly reflexive institution, attuned to the choices of a multiplicity of actors expressing themselves in the market-place through the cultural codes of fashion. Trace the consequences of the cultural choices made by a group of teenagers in a European shopping mall on a Saturday afternoon with their eyes on how they will look that evening in the local club: this uncovers a level of connectivity leading to the employment prospects of a sweatshop worker in the Philippines. And second, the connectivity implied is in the fact that clothing choices, like all consumption choices, have global ecological consequences in terms of the natural resources they consume and the industrial production processes they entail.

A world of complex connectivity (a global market-place, international fashion codes, an international division of labour, a shared eco-system) thus links the myriad small everyday actions of millions with the fates of distant, unknown others and even with the possible

fate of the planet. All these individual actions are undertaken within the culturally meaningful context of local mundane lifeworlds in which dress codes and the subtle differentiations of fashion establish personal and cultural identity. The way in which these 'cultural actions' become globally consequential is the prime sense in which culture matters for globalization. To be sure, the complexity of this chain of consequences simultaneously entails the political, economic and technological dimensions of globalization. But the point is that the 'moment of the cultural' is indispensable in interpreting complex connectivity.

Thinking about globalization in its cultural dimension also discloses its essentially *dialectical* character in a particularly vivid way. The fact that individual actions are intimately connected with large structural-institutional features of the social world via reflexivity means globalization is not a 'one-way' process of the determination of events by massive global structures, but involves at least the possibility for local intervention in global processes. There exists a cultural politics of the global which we can grasp by continuing the example of the ecological consequences of local actions.

Though the consequentiality of routine lifestyle choices may not always be recognized – most of us surely don't shop habitually as 'ecoaware' consumers – there is nevertheless a trend in certain sections of all societies towards deliberate eco-friendly consumption practices, which is itself a manifestation of connectivity. The famous Green movement slogan 'Think globally, act locally' suggests a political strategy motivated by a very clear collective cultural narrative of what the 'good life' entails. This strategy involves the mobilization of agents – increasingly via sophisticated media campaigns – to achieve institutional changes at a global level (Lash 1994: 211). And if such a strategy is (sometimes) successful, it is because it draws on and appeals to very general cultural dispositions more than engagement with scientific-technical arguments over environmental problems.

For instance, Greenpeace's spectacular defeat of Shell UK over the deep-sea dumping of the Brent Spar oil platform in June 1995 was achieved by mobilizing public opinion – particularly in Germany, Denmark and The Netherlands – which directly threatened Shell's 'customer relations' at the filling stations. From the perspective of the Green movement this could be seen as a conspicuous success story of social reflexivity. But if we ask what lay behind the mobilization of public opinion, it seems likely that it was something other than the precise issues of the campaign itself – over which there was

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considerable confusion. For example, many of those boycotting Shell's filling stations apparently thought that the plan was to dump the platform in the North Sea – their 'locality' – rather than the Atlantic. Furthermore, Greenpeace later admitted to having been themselves misled about the actual composition of the chemicals on board the platform. There were in fact claims following the campaign that the media had been 'bounced' into providing favourable coverage of Greenpeace, along with emotive footage of the activists under siege by Shell's security staff, at the expense of the full complex scientific argument. The senior commissioning editor for the UK's Channel 4 claimed, 'The pictures provided to us [by Greenpeace] showed plucky helicopters riding into a fusillade of water canons. Try and write the analytical science into that.'

However, we can understand all this differently if we see the Brent Spar campaign as appealing to people's ongoing life-narratives, rather than to specific environmental arguments whose technicalities few can anyway grasp. So what was, perhaps, most significant was the *symbolic* value of the occupation of the platform: a particular dramatization of a 'battle' against a generalized threat of environmental degradation that people experience as part of their everyday 'lifeworld'. Understood in this way, the strategy of Greenpeace is (at least in part) a cultural one. Even the issue of scientific accuracy could be seen as having cultural significance in the maintenance of general trust relations between Greenpeace (or Shell), the media and the public – as much as in terms of information or misinformation. As Scott Lash puts it, environmental politics now involve 'the social construction of reality' – 'a struggle in the media between environmental protest actors, business actors and policy-makers around a set of meanings to be disseminated among the lay public [and framing] their reality' (1994: 208). Environmental politics are thus *cultural* politics, dependent for their success on the degree to which they can tap into the horizon of relevance of local lifeworlds. So culture also matters for globalization in this sense: that it marks out a symbolic terrain of meaning-construction as the arena for global political interventions.

Why Globalization Matters for Culture

Globalization disturbs the way we conceptualize 'culture'. For culture has long had connotations tying it to the idea of a fixed locality. The idea of 'a culture' implicitly connects meaning construction with

particularity and location. As Eade (1997: 25) notes, 'an emphasis on boundedness and coherence traditionally dominated the sociological treatment of the idea of culture', particularly in the functionalist tradition where collective meaning construction was dealt with largely as serving the purposes of social integration. So 'a culture' parallels the problematic notion of 'a society' as a bounded entity (Mann 1986) occupying a physical territory mapped as a political territory (predominantly the nation-state) and binding individual meaning constructions into this circumscribed social, political space. The connectivity of globalization is clearly threatening to such conceptualizations, not only because the multiform penetration of localities breaks into this binding of meanings to place, but because it undermines the thinking through which culture and fixity of location are originally paired.

In anthropology, James Clifford's work on 'travelling cultures' (Clifford 1992, 1997) has focused on prising culture apart from location. Writing of the 'practices of crossing and interaction that troubled the localism of many common assumptions about culture' he argues: 'In these assumptions authentic social existence is, or should be, centred in circumscribed places – like the gardens where the word "culture" derived its European meanings. Dwelling was understood to be the local ground of collective life, travel a supplement; roots always precede routes' (1997: 3). Clifford demonstrates how the practices of anthropological fieldwork have contributed to the localizing of the concept of culture: 'centering the *culture* around a particular locus, the *village*, and around a certain spatial practice of dwelling/research which itself depended on a complementary localization – that of the *field*' (1997: 20). So the traditional research methods of anthropology – the village taken as a 'manageable unit' for cultural analysis, the practice of ethnography as 'dwelling' with the community – have contributed to a synecdoche in which location (village) is taken for culture. And, Clifford argues, this has endured into contemporary ethnographic fieldwork practices where the locations may be, 'hospitals, labs, urban neighbourhoods, tourist hotels' rather than remote villages, but the informing assumption for the researcher and subject is one of 'localized dwelling'.

Clifford goes against the grain of this inheritance to think of culture as essentially *mobile* rather than static, to treat 'practices of displacement ... as constitutive of cultural meanings'. And in this he raises something very close to the conceptual challenge globalization makes to culture. Culture cannot be thought of as having these inevitable *conceptual* ties to location, for meanings are equally

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Yet the notion of 'travelling culture' can also be tendentious. It's not that we have to *reverse* the priority between 'roots and routes', insisting on the essence of culture as restless nomadic movement. Rather we need to see 'roots and routes' as always coexistent in culture, and both as subject to transformation in global modernity. To return to the earlier discussion of travel, we have to remember that a huge proportion of cultural experience is still for the majority the day-to-day experience of physical location, rather than of constant movement. In fact Clifford admits this point in describing an objection to the trope of 'travel', made by another anthropologist, Christina Turner. Turner pointed to the obvious limitations on movement that vast numbers are subject to – being 'kept in their place' by their class and gender position. Her ethnographic work with female Japanese factory workers, 'women who have not "travelled" by any standard definition', led her to question Clifford's stress on 'literal travel'. But these women's 'local' cultural experience and practice also disturbed the culture-locality connection: 'They do watch TV; they do have a global/local sense; they do contradict the anthropologist's typifications; and they don't simply enact a culture' (Clifford 1997: 28). In accepting this, Clifford concedes that the notion of travelling culture 'can involve forces that pass powerfully through – television, radio, tourists, commodities, armies' (ibid.).

This is precisely the point I want to stress: globalization promotes much more physical mobility than ever before, but the key to its cultural impact is in the transformation of localities themselves. It is important to keep to the fore the material conditions of physical embodiment and of political-economic necessity that 'keep people in their place', and so for me the transformation of culture is not grasped in the trope of travel but in the idea of *detrterritorialization*. What I shall understand by this – as I explore it in chapter 4 – is that complex connectivity weakens the ties of culture to place. This is in many ways a troubling phenomenon, involving the simultaneous penetration of local worlds by distant forces, and the dislodging of everyday meanings from their 'anchors' in the local environment. Embodiment and the forces of material circumstance keep most of us, most of the time, situated, but in places that are changing around us and gradually, subtly, losing their power to define the terms of our existence. This is undoubtedly an uneven and often contradictory business, felt more forcibly in some places than others, and sometimes met by countervailing tendencies to re-establish the power

of locality. Nevertheless deterritorialization is, I believe, the major cultural impact of global connectivity. And it's not all bad news.

For the final point to make is that connectivity also furnishes people with a *cultural resource* that they lacked before its expansion: a cultural awareness which is, in various senses, 'global'. Roland Robertson has always stressed that globalization intrinsically involves 'the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole' (1992: 8) and Giddens (1991: 187) also argues that people's 'phenomenal worlds', though situated locally, 'for the most part are truly global'. This doesn't mean that we all experience the world as cultural cosmopolitans, much less that a 'global culture' is emerging. But it does imply that 'the global' increasingly exists as a cultural horizon within which we (to varying degrees) frame our existence. The penetration of localities which connectivity brings is thus double-edged: as it dissolves the securities of locality, it offers new understandings of experience in wider – ultimately global – terms.

Grasping the nature and significance of this global consciousness constitutes an important agenda in the cultural analysis of globalization. The Japanese woman Christina Turner describes are surely not unusual in having a 'global/local sense' as part of their everyday life, and one obvious source of this is the images and information that flows to them – as to millions of us – through the routine use of globalizing media technologies like television. One task for cultural analysis is therefore to understand the 'phenomenology' of this global consciousness, particularly in the mediated form in which it mostly appears to us. And it is not difficult to see that the horizon of significance made available by the connectivity of media technologies suggests possibilities not only for the reconstitution of the cultural meanings and identities depleted by deterritorialization, but also for associated forms of global cultural politics. A sense of our mutual interdependency combined with the means for communicating across distance is producing new forms of cultural/political alliance and solidarity. These are undoubtedly weakly developed at present in comparison with the concentrations of power within, for instance, transnational capitalism. But as some argue (Castells 1997), the global perspective of the 'new social movements' may prove to be embryonic forms of a wider, more powerful order of social resistance to the repressive aspects of globalization. However this turns out, it is clear that the reconfiguration of cultural experience that connectivity produces will be crucial to the possibilities of a cosmopolitan politics. Globalization therefore matters for culture in the sense that it brings the negotiation of cultural experience into the

centre of strategies for intervention in the other realms of connectivity: the political, the environmental, the economic.

This concludes the broad discussion of the scope of cultural globalization. The chapters which follow pursue the cultural implications of complex connectivity along a number of different trajectories: pursuing the theme of unicity into ideas of a global culture (chapter 3); examining the 'lifting off' of cultural experience from locality (chapter 4); interrogating the significance of mediated experience in globalized culture (chapter 5) and finally discussing the role of culture in an emergent 'cosmopolitan' politics (chapter 6). But before this, we turn in the following chapter to arguments that locate globalization within the historical and theoretical context of social modernity, and try to draw out the cultural implications of this way of thinking about the complex connectivity which defines our times.

4

Deterritorialization: The Cultural Condition of Globalization

The previous chapter addressed the most 'obvious' though, as it turned out, least plausible implication of globalization for cultural change – the question of the prospects, viewed either with anticipation or foreboding, for the emergence of a single, unified global culture. This chapter adopts a rather more oblique approach. Here we explore a broad conceptual category through which we might think about the cultural implications of globalization. This category grasps a number of aspects of a globalized (as distinct from a global) culture as it is lived in daily experience, but it relates these to one key assumption, namely that globalization fundamentally transforms the relationship between the *places* we inhabit and our cultural practices, experiences and identities. 'Places', Morley and Robins provocatively claim, 'are no longer the clear supports of our identity' (1995: 87). In employing the concept of 'deterritorialization' we will try to understand why this might be so.

The Concept of Deterritorialization

Several theorists have used the term 'deterritorialization' in relation to globalizing processes (e.g. Appadurai 1990; García Canclini 1995; Mlinar 1992; Lull 1995; Featherstone 1995; Mattelart 1994; Morley and Robins 1995; Latouche 1996) while others have preferred related terms such as 'delocalization' (Thompson 1995) or 'dis-placement' (Giddens 1990) to grasp aspects of the process. Though there are several differences of emphasis between these usages,¹ I think it is possible to identify a *general* sense of the concept which can help us understand broad transformations in the place-culture relationship in the context of

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global modernity. So I want to use the term 'deterritorialization' in this very broad, inclusive, way to grasp what García Canclini calls, 'the loss of the "natural" relation of culture to geographical and social territories' (1995: 229). To approach this I want to return, briefly, to Giddens's account of the implications of time-space distancing and disembedding for our experience of place.

As we saw in chapter 2, a central aspect of Giddens's argument is that modernity frees social relations from the constrictions of face-to-face interactions in the localities of pre-modern societies, allowing for the stretching of relations across time and space which is, for him, the core of globalization. But, of course, the disembedding involved does not mean that people cease to live their lives in 'real' localities. So from the point of view of cultural experience, what becomes important is the way in which this stretching of social relations affects the character of the localities that we typically inhabit. As will be recalled from the earlier discussion, Giddens grasps this transformation by describing modern places as increasingly 'phantasmagoric'. The comforting, familiar character of the cultural settings we routinely move amongst conceals the influences of distant social forces and processes.

However, he argues against the familiar claim that modernity means the loss of the existential comforts and assurances of local communal experience in the face of increasingly 'abstract' social forces which structure our lives. Rather, he argues that we retain a sense of familiarity in our day-to-day experience of local contexts, but that this familiarity no longer derives from 'the particularities of localized place'. People may still be 'at home' in their localities but they are at some level aware that these are 'phantasmagoric' places in which familiar features are often not unique to that locale and part of its 'organic development' but, rather, features that have been 'placed into' the locale by distanced forces:

The local shopping mall is a milieu in which a sense of ease and security is cultivated by the layout of the buildings and the careful planning of public places. Yet everyone who shops there is aware that most of the shops are chain stores, which one might find in any city, and indeed that innumerable shopping malls of similar design exist elsewhere. (1990: 141)

So the experience of 'displacement' in modernity is not one of alienation, but of ambivalence. People 'own' their local places phenomenologically in a sort of *provisional* sense, recognizing, at

some level, the absent forces which structure this ownership. And, of course, this perception is linked to the reality of a steadily declining local ownership of public spaces in a direct material sense linked to the globalization of capital. The small retail businesses – ‘corner shops’ – run by local families which were once ubiquitous in the United Kingdom, as in many European countries, have been largely replaced in the last forty years by supermarkets² and the rather anachronistically named ‘high street’ chains located in shopping precincts. Such shops in the ‘mall’ – itself an ambivalent public/private space unknown in the UK before the 1960s – appear and disappear at the behest of global market forces, not, primarily, as the expression of local will, other than in the formalities of planning provisions.

But the argument is not simply one about the transformation of public communal spaces. As we saw in chapter 2, we can contrast the most intimate locales of modernity – our private living spaces – with the dwellings of pre-modern societies in terms of their relative degree of ‘openness to the world’, particularly as a consequence of the routine use of domestic communications technologies. So the link between our mundane cultural experience and our location is transformed at every level. As Giddens has it, ‘the very tissue of spatial experience alters, conjoining proximity and distance in ways that have few parallels in prior ages’ (1990: 140).

This is the experience that I shall try to understand here through the category of deterritorialization. This experience is fundamental to the way we live our daily lives in modern societies: it touches nearly all aspects of our mundane practices, it has become ‘naturalized’ and taken for granted in the routine flow of experience and yet it is a complex and ambivalent cultural condition. It is important to stress this ambivalence and therefore to distinguish the condition of deterritorialization from the claim that global modernity, in its massifying, centralizing moment, is *destructive* of real localities. I don’t believe this is the case, however much similar terms – ‘displacement’, ‘de-localization’ – might at first glance suggest it. To make this important distinction we can consider the idea that modernity replaces real localities with ‘non-places’.

Non-places

The French anthropologist Marc Augé describes ‘non-places’ as follows:

If a place is identical, or people and the conditions of its existence are all marked through thus ordinary objects

Augé argues that modernity creates ‘non-places’ through the routine use of domestic communications technologies. As an example, he cites the Thirteenth-century French held:

At regular intervals, [the] life of the people, with its own particularities, is forgotten or in the past that still exists in France

There is a picture of them as characters

If a place can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with identity, then a space which cannot be defined as relational or historical, or concerned with identity will be a non-place. . . . A world where people are born in the clinic and die in hospital, where transit points and temporary abodes are proliferating under luxurious or inhuman conditions (hotel chains and squats, holiday clubs and refugee camps, shantytowns . . .); where a dense network of means of transport which are also inhabited spaces is developing; where the habitué of supermarkets, slot machines and credit cards communicates wordlessly, through gestures, with an abstract, unmediated commerce; a world thus surrendered to solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the temporary and ephemeral, offers the anthropologist (and others) a new object. (Augé 1995: 78)

Augé argues that contemporary capitalist modernity creates a distinct mode of mundane locational experience which he describes as 'supermodernity', defining our increasing interactions with these 'non-places'. His examples are of airport departure lounges, supermarkets, motorways and service stations, street-corner cash dispensers, high-speed trains. These supermodern locales are, for him, 'non-places' in distinction from the 'anthropological places' that 'create the organically social' (1995: 94).

As an instance of an 'anthropological place' – one that provides cultural identity and memory, binding its inhabitants to the history of the locale through the daily repetitions of 'organic' social interaction – he offers the following generalized description of the centres of typical small French provincial towns, 'as they appeared under the Third Republic . . . the leading cafés, hotels and businesses . . . concentrated in the town centre, not far from where the market is held':

At regular intervals, on Sunday or market day, the centre 'comes to life'. [It is a place] where individual itineraries can intersect and mingle, where a few words are exchanged and solitudes momentarily forgotten, on the church steps, in front of the town hall, at the café counter or in the baker's doorway: the rather lazy rhythm and talkative mood that still characterize Sunday mornings in contemporary provincial France. (1995: 66–7)

There is undoubtedly something of the nostalgic in Augé's depiction of these 'real' places. But, interestingly, he doesn't think of them as part of a disappearing world of 'traditional life', but as characteristic of an earlier period of modernity itself – what he calls

'Baudelairean' modernity (p. 92), in which the link between the present and the past, the old and the new, is still visible and the link between place, memory and identity is preserved in routine interactions. Baudelairean modernity, as he says, is still alive in contemporary France, but it is threatened by the incursions of 'supermodernity'. In these 'non-places', 'talkative' organic interactions are replaced by mute signs: the instructions on the VDUs of automatic cash dispensers – 'Please withdraw your card. Thank you for your custom' – or illuminated signs on motorways – 'Two-kilometre tailback on A3.' In contrast to the conviviality of the market square, the supermarket shopper engages in a silent, solitary congress with labels, instructions and self-weigh machines. Even real 'anthropological places' can become transformed into non-places for outsiders as their real lived-history becomes 'textualized'. As an example of this he describes the experience of driving along autoroutes which bypass provincial towns and yet advertise their attractions as heritage sites on sign boards: 'drivers battling down the *autoroute du sud* are urged to pay attention a thirteenth-century fortified village, a renowned vineyard, the "eternal hill" of Vézelay . . .' (p. 97). The non-place of the autoroute is defined for Augé precisely by its routing round real places whilst fixing these in signs aimed at commodifying them. The theme is pursued in his treatment of motorway service stations, 'adopting an increasingly aggressive role as centres of regional culture, selling a range of local goods with a few maps and guide books'. His point is that the anonymous, ersatz, non-place of the service station – probably as close to the 'real place' as most travellers get – is a sort of simulacrum of anthropological place. The same argument is applied to travel on the high-speed TGV trains, where images in the rail company magazines provided for passengers stand in for the real places no longer clearly visible – even the names of stations now impossible to read as the train flashes by. Places are therefore increasingly 'invaded by texts'.

Non-places are, as we can see, bleak locales of contemporary modernity: places of solitude (even in the presence of others), silence, anonymity, alienation and impermanence. They are places where interaction is instrumental and 'contractual' – the apotheosis of *Gesellschaft* – lifted out of any organic relation with a community existing in continuity through time. Augé's argument is also one that privileges the 'local' as the site of the genuine. The efficient 'connectivity' of the TGV and the autoroute are contrasted with 'local [railway] services and the roads of local interest' which 'used to penetrate the intimacy of everyday life'. The local railway, in particular, as it

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passes slowly around backs of houses, 'catches provincials off guard in the privacy of their daily lives, behind the façade, on the garden side, the kitchen or bedroom side' (pp. 98–9).

The immediate critical response might be to see this as another version of anti-modern 'alienation theory', conjuring a comparison with a mythical *Gemeinschaft*. But this would be to miss the main point: that non-places, however problematically marked off against the 'authenticity' of anthropological places, are none the less genuinely new, peculiar cultural-spatial phenomena, unique features of our late twentieth-century cultural landscape. Augé brings the ethnographic eye to these new salient features, and argues, I think plausibly, that 'some experience of non-place (indissociable from a more or less clear perception of the acceleration of history and the contraction of the planet) is today an essential part of all social existence' (p. 119).

The experience of non-places, then, is certainly an *aspect* of what I want to understand by deterritorialized culture. However it is important to keep their significance in proportion. In the first place, the sort of locales Augé describes do not, as he concedes, map the totality of modern cultural-spatial experience: 'real' places and non-places 'intertwine and tangle together' in modern societies (p. 107). As we saw in chapter 1, the 'world' of the international air terminal coexists spatially and culturally with the neighbourhood pressed up against its perimeter fences. The danger, then, is that we come to think of deterritorialization as *only* applying to this world of transit and impermanence. One feature of Augé's discourse that encourages this is his standpoint as the eternal *passenger*, always viewing locales as one passing through them – on trains, in cars, on planes. This perspective accentuates the alienating, individualizing, contractual aspect of non-places.

Take the example of the processing of passengers through Roissy 1 airport that runs as a leitmotiv through his book. Stressing the contractual nature of relations here – as instantiated in the routines of documentation that establish the 'validity' of the passenger's presence in the locale – the checking of tickets, boarding passes, passports, visas – he contrasts these interactions with 'the complicities of language, local reference, the unformulated rules of living know-how that apply to 'anthropological place'. So, he challenges: 'Try to imagine a Durkheimian analysis of the transit lounge at Roissy!' (p. 94). But what he does not account for here is the entirely different experience of Roissy that belongs to its more permanent denizens – the check-in clerks, baggage handlers, cleaners, caterers, security staff

and so forth who work there. For these people the non-place of the terminal is clearly a 'real' place – their workplace. And we must assume that it is experienced by them with all the anthropological richness, the tacit rules of 'living know-how', the subtleties of daily interpersonal contact, the friendships, rivalries and so on that apply to any other place of work.³ So the designation of places as non-places is clearly not an absolute, but one that depends, crucially on *perspective*.

What this also implies, of course, is that non-places are not necessarily so intrinsically alienating, but can be places where social relations can be re-embedded. Compare Augé's description of the instrumental interaction at the supermarket checkout, 'The customer . . . hands his credit card to a young woman as silent as himself – anyway not very chatty – who runs each article past the sensor of a decoding machine . . .' (p. 100), with this very different account from a British lesbian woman of her social use of supermarket shopping:

It is funny going to Sainsbury's . . . I never go there without seeing a lot of dykes . . . which is nice! And people you haven't seen for ages, so you kind of end up – what was going to be like twenty minutes nipping in getting a few things, you know, you end up chatting to people and that's quite – I do enjoy that. (Bell and Valentine 1997: 138)

Just how different, we may ask, is this from encounters on the church steps or the *mairie* of Baudelairean modernity? Well different, admittedly, in terms of the overall texture of 'late modern' social relations, but not intrinsically different on some axis of organic versus contractual relations. The point is that non-places can be seen as particular, distinct instances of 'deterritorialized' locales, embodying distanced relations, but this does not necessarily render them socially or culturally sterile. Mike Featherstone makes a similar point in a discussion of the small, subtle but taken-for-granted social routines and rituals that pick out the unique cultural character – the 'at homeness' – of *any* 'locality' for those who live and work there: 'the little rituals of buying a round of drinks in a particular way . . .' Citing Gertrude Stein's famous remark about Oakland, California – 'There's no there there' – he shows how this could be read as registering, 'the apparent absence of . . . affective and symbolic sedimentation into the material fabric of the buildings and the environment and the embodied practices of social life' (Featherstone 1995: 94). But of course this is to view the locale from the cultural exterior: Stein's quip, as Featherstone says, was referring to a dearth of 'recognizable

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cultural capital', whilst for the actual inhabitants of Oakland, no doubt, the place was experienced as a meaningful and affectively rich – if perhaps not a vivid – locality. For the residents, the 'there' of Oakland lies in the fact that 'they're there.'

The concept of deterritorialization, then, has to be able to grasp the novelty of the contemporary transformation of place – its positive as well as its negative features – without yielding to the temptation to read this as simply the impoverishment or, indeed, the dissolution of cultural interaction. We can get a little further in understanding this intrinsic ambivalence of deterritorialization by considering a hypothetical case of the 'lived experience' of global modernity.

The Mundane Experience of Deterritorialization

Raymond Williams provided the basis for this (actually before most people had begun to talk about globalization) in the following little vignette of bourgeois 'cosmopolitan' western lifestyle:

There was once this Englishman who worked in the London office of a multinational corporation based in the United States. He drove home one evening in his Japanese car. His wife, who worked in a firm which imported German kitchen equipment, was already at home. Her small Italian car was often quicker through the traffic. After a meal which included New Zealand lamb, Californian carrots, Mexican honey, French cheese and Spanish wine they settled down to watch a programme on their television set, which had been made in Finland. The programme was a retrospective celebration of the war to recapture the Falkland Islands. As they watched it they felt warmly patriotic, and very proud to be British. (Williams 1983: 177)

Williams uses this sketch to launch a discussion of the contradictory nature of contemporary national identity, and we *could* pursue this by thinking about how the globalization of mundane experience may make a stable sense of 'local' cultural identity (including national identity) increasingly difficult to maintain, as our daily lives become more and more interwoven with, and penetrated by, influences and experiences that have their origins far away. But we can equally take the experience of this (rather complacent) couple to illustrate the broader substance of deterritorialization, without being drawn too much back to the discourse of nationality which we tried to escape from in the previous chapter.

Since part of the argument about globalization is that it is a rapidly accelerating process, it might be interesting to bring this hypothetical couple quickly up to date from the early 1980s to the late 1990s. There is, first, a context of rapidly developing 'world events' to be considered here. As these fifteen or so years fast forward across their TV screen, our couple will witness enormous and unpredictable changes, many of which are directly connected with the broad process of globalization: both resulting from and contributing to it. So, for example: Chernobyl and its (literal and metaphorical) fallout, the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the communist world, the movement towards closer European unity represented in the Maastricht Treaty and the single European currency, the deregulation of global capitalist markets exemplified in the 'Big Bang' of the London stock exchange, global summits on environmental pollution and climate change, and of course, other wars – Beirut, the Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda – all played out with increasing technical sophistication and 'immediacy' in their living rooms.

There are at least two senses in which such global events may relate to the cultural experience of deterritorialization. First, some of them will have direct effects on people's immediate material conditions and environments. For example, European Union regulations may impact (positively or negatively) on the working practices of small local businesses, or EU regional development grants may transform the local built environments of depressed inner city areas. The way in which local people experience these interventions (as either unjustified interference and a threat to 'our British way of life', or the promise of a new, if rather vague, European identity and 'communal' project) will clearly depend, largely, on the degree to which they benefit or are disadvantaged. But underlying this is surely the growing awareness of the significance of 'remote' forces beyond what, at a rather fundamental level and over an extended period of historical time, we have come to think of as our 'natural' and valid polity – the territorial boundaries of our nation-state.⁴ In the case of the impact of European Union legislation, the experience of distant determinations can be related to definite (if arcane) international political/economic processes and to identifiable agents and loci of power (Brussels 'Eurocrats'). But other events create more dramatic and seemingly random impacts – for example the effects on domestic economies of fluctuations on world capitalist markets. The most spectacular of these are the periodic international stock market or currency crises – the 'Black Days' referred to in chapter 3. People experiencing

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the impact of such events – on their jobs, their mortgage payments or their savings – are of course liable to feel generally more insecure in planning their lives and less confident in their national government's ability to control events. But, more broadly, such events may add to the extension of the individual's 'phenomenal world': people probably come to include distant events and processes more routinely in their perceptions of what is significant for their own personal lives. This is one aspect of what deterritorialization may involve: the ever-broadening horizon of relevance in people's routine experience, removing not only general 'cultural awareness' but, crucially, the processes of individual 'life planning' from a self-contained context centred on physical locality or politically defined territory.

Of course such effects will be uneven in their impact – distant wars, for example, may not have the same direct impact on people's mundane experience as economic crises. But there is another sense in which conflicts are more immediate, loom larger in daily experience than ever before and this is, of course, in the way they are 'delivered' to our homes by globalizing media technologies, particularly by television. We shall discuss the media's role in cultural globalization in more detail – including the specific 'phenomenology' involved – in chapter 5. But it is important here to outline the broad significance of the media in the process of deterritorialization. And we can begin by considering the sheer ubiquity of media and communications technologies in modern mundane experience – and the way in which, as a consequence, mediated experience becomes imbricated with 'immediate' experience.

So, to return to our time-travelling couple. As successful and affluent business people, they have acquired lots of new communications technology since the early eighties to keep them 'in touch' with the world: satellite or (more discreetly) cable TV, cellphones, paging machines, fax machines, computers and 'laptops', modems to connect with the internet, and so on. They now routinely pick up and send their e-mail and maybe will even surf the internet as an alternative to watching the television. One of the interesting things about the way they use this communications technology is how quickly they take it for granted, how it soon loses its wonder and becomes integral to everyday life. But how do they experience the way in which their home is now more 'open' to information? In one straightforward sense they are, at least potentially, much better informed. For example they can now choose between the coverage of news events not simply of different national 'terrestrial' broadcasters (the BBC or ITN) but of commercial satellite channels like

BSkyB, international news specialists like CNN or even, allowing for the language problems, of other national stations in Europe or beyond. Not only this; they can now check this coverage against information from specialist websites on the internet. So, for example, they might want to check the BBC's coverage of some environmental issue against the version provided on Greenpeace International's website.

There is a sense, then, in which this very *choice* provided by new media technologies contributes to deterritorialization. Being 'better informed' implies having available a range of perspectives on events beyond that of the 'home culture', being able to situate oneself at a distance from the (national, local) 'viewpoint'. Whatever this may promise for the development of cosmopolitan cultural dispositions, it also represents a loss of the cultural certainty, even of the existential 'comfort' involved in having the world 'out there' presented to us from the still point of an unchallenged national/local perspective. Deterritorialization in this sense of opening up to the world and expanding cultural horizons via globalized media may thus be an ambiguous condition.

This sort of ambiguity is also suggested in the way communicational technologies can be conceived of as, simultaneously, 'exits from' and 'entrances into' our intimate living spaces. The corollary to 'keeping in touch' might be the sense that our attention to the outside world is more constantly in demand, that we are continually 'on duty' as communicational agents. This is, of course, a perception now widely distributed in relation to the telephone: simultaneously a blessing and a curse, the ubiquitous (indispensable?) tool of social convenience, and the alien presence always ready to summon us, imposing its own implacable priority over our chosen activities of the moment. But now there are also all the faxes and e-mails to be responded to, the answerphone messages to be 'got back to', the cellphone or the pager that accompanies us even while on the move, the TV programmes to remember to video and then to find the time to watch. In all these ways media and communications technologies have cultural significance not only in terms of the messages and representations they carry, but in their capacity to structure our experience and use of time and space. Communicational connectedness, being 'plugged into' the global media and communications network has implications for our experience of the distinction between a public and a private sphere: our couple might sense that the information affluence they enjoy also means their home is no longer quite their castle. Joshua Meyrowitz (1985) quotes John Ruskin to good effect here:

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This is the nature of home – it is a place of peace; the shelter not only from all injury, but from all terror, doubt and division. In so far as it is not this, it is not home; so far as the anxieties of the outer life penetrate into it, and the inconsistently minded, unknown, unloved, or hostile society of the outer world is allowed by either husband or wife to cross the threshold, it ceases to be a home; it is then only a part of the outer world which you have roofed over and lighted a fire in. ('Of Queen's Gardens', quoted Meyrowitz 1985: 222)

Meyrowitz uses Ruskin's romantic notion of the sacrosanct private space of the home to illustrate how media technologies have contributed to disclosing the gender politics of the private sphere and thus 'politicizing the personal' in family life.⁵ However the quotation can equally be taken to reflect a more general point. Ruskin's paternalist sexual politics aside, his anxieties over the disconcerting intrusion of the outer world into the domestic sphere have a peculiar resonance in the mediated culture of the late twentieth century.

What is at stake here is a shift in the phenomenology of that space which defines the house as the home. This, for Ruskin, depended on the notion of a 'shelter' both as the figure of physical protection – 'roofing over' a space – and as psychological and emotional protection, the forming of a boundary – the 'threshold', the liminal space – separating the outer world from the inner world of intimacy and subjectivity. This is a spatial distinction which, as Marc Augé points out, can be traced to the classical mythological figures of Hestia and Hermes: 'Hestia symbolizes the circular hearth placed in the centre of the house, the closed space of the group drawn into itself (and thus in a sense of its relations with itself); while Hermes, god of the threshold and the door, but also of crossroads and town gates, represents movement and relations with others' (Augé 1995: 58).

Thinking along the lines of this classical dualism, we could imagine the penetration of the modern domestic space as the triumph of Hermes over Hestia. After all, Hermes was also the god of communications – in the Roman version of the myth, Mercury, the messenger of the gods and now, inevitably, a telephone company. The mythology reinforces the gender politics of course. Hestia was Vesta in Roman myth, the enclosed (virginal) guardian of the sacred domestic flame. But again there is more at stake in the figures of the hearth and the threshold than this sort of (gendered) dualism. The incursions of the world 'out there' are ambiguous in their implications, grasped by the figure of Janus – the Roman god of the threshold – who famously faced two ways.

We can find some interesting parallels to Ruskin's view in Gaston Bachelard's *Poetics of Space* (Bachelard 1969). As Ann Game (1995) shows, Bachelard's attempts to describe the phenomenology – the affective and imaginative experience – of houses, centred precisely on the notion of shelter and protection, on 'the intimate values of inside space', the 'immediate well-being, the inhabiting, a dwelling encloses' (Bachelard, quoted in Game 1995: 200–1). But this 'sheltering' is not merely (as it might be read in Ruskin) about the exclusion of a potentially threatening, divisive 'hostile society'; in Bachelard the house is conceived as imaginatively constituting an aspect of the human self as 'dweller' – indeed the house becomes part of the embodied self – 'the house is in the body' (Game 1995: 202). As Game argues, 'protection' and 'shelter' point to the self-constitutive principles of 'integration' and 'binding', and so 'the house provides continuity, a counter to the dispersion of the subject' (p. 201). So it is not merely the privacy of bourgeois family life that is threatened by the penetration of the outer world into the inner: there is also an implied challenge to the 'boundary' which constitutes the self. This however does not necessarily have to be imaged as a *threat* to self-identity, but perhaps as a movement in the placing of the boundary between the 'private self' (say, the self of the insular familiar structure) and the self imagined in relation to a wider horizon of human belonging. The shifting of this 'threshold' produced by the penetration of the enclosed space of the house by globalizing technologies – to an extent unthought of in either Ruskin or Bachelard – thus becomes a way of thinking the ambivalent effects of deterritorialization on self-identity.

But, of course the domestic setting is by no means the only one in which the cultural effects of deterritorialization are felt. Our couple don't sit at home every evening. For example, since the new multiplex arrived in the 1980s they go to the cinema more, and this in itself is an oddly deterritorialized experience. The cinema complex is on an 'out-of-town' site on the edge of the business park and trading estate and so surrounded, as they arrive in the twilight, by dark warehouses rather than the pubs and shops and restaurants around the old city-centre Odeon or Gaumont. But it is, of course, so much easier – and safer – to park here. Once inside, the sense that this is an environment that has been artificially 'placed into' the locality continues – this is clearly an *American* cinema, evident from the transatlantic voice-overs in the trailers and the slightly jarring terms in the screened announcements ('candy', 'please deposit trash') to the giant buckets of popcorn being consumed.

And unsurprisingly a majority will be 'integrated' with images of local places they find here. Reception such as adaptations of *the Dove*, probably. Do they feel that transient locations great open spaces of the thrillers familiar? This moments without at first hand. Ryan and Ted Edward Ferrara our cultural is up out of all time and magazines any of them.

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And unsurprisingly, of the dozen or so movies on offer, the great majority will be Hollywood movies, since the multiplex is 'vertically integrated' with the American companies producing the films. What images of locality, what landscapes and what linguistic cadences will they find here as backdrops to the narratives? With the odd exception such as *Four Weddings and a Funeral* and *The Full Monty* or adaptations of classic novels like *Sense and Sensibility* or *The Wings of the Dove*, probably mainly ones from the US. Does this alienate them? Do they feel the victims of cultural imperialism? Or aren't these distant locations – the actual physical landscapes of America, from the great open spaces of the western or the road movie, to the cityscapes of the thrillers or the TV cops series – somehow, paradoxically, rather familiar? Think of how effortlessly we can relate to these environments without ever, most of us Europeans, having experienced them at first hand. Don't we very easily feel as much 'at home' with Meg Ryan and Tom Hanks in Seattle, as with Elinor Dashwood and Edward Ferrars in Devonshire? For where *are* these places except in our cultural imagination, our repertoire of 'textual locations' built up out of all the millions of images in films, TV programmes, books and magazines that we have encountered? And do we really *require* any of them to correspond all that closely with our 'real' locality?

A further aspect of deterritorialization, then, is the lifting out of locality that occurs in this intertextual realm of the imagination. One way of thinking about this is to compare the routine consumption of images of distant places, and their normalization in the mediated lifeworld of the individual, with the processes Michael Billig describes as *Banal Nationalism* (Billig 1995). What Billig means by banal nationalism is the routine reinforcement, through the steady tempo of everyday life, of images which attach the citizen's identity to the nation-state. This is the process, which he contrasts with the 'hot nationalism' of 'waved or saluted flags', by which, 'Daily the nation is indicated, or "flagged", in the lives of its citizenry' (Billig 1995: 6). The sorts of example Billig gives – pursued in a subtle social-psychological discourse analysis – are the routine rhetorical forms of address of national politicians, or the deixis – the 'rhetorical pointing' – of the delivery of news in national daily newspapers. It is not just in the coverage of politics, but of home news, sport, popular culture ('The Great British Pub') and even reporting the weather that the subtle positioning of the reader (or viewer) as a member of the nation that is 'home' is achieved.

Now the comparison I want to draw with the thesis of banal nationalism is not at all one that challenges it. Billig also discusses

the idea, which he associates with a postmodern take on globalization, that banal nationalism is being replaced by 'banal globalism' (1995: 129ff). He rejects this – rightly I believe – on the basis of the demonstrable persistence of strategies and practices of national identification – both in its hot and banal forms – in the contemporary world. Here his position is close to that of Anthony Smith discussed in chapter 3. And I agree with him. However, the point I want to make is that the more or less deliberate ideological promptings of banal nationalism compete on the same phenomenological terrain with a whole range of more random deterritorializing imagery. The embedded familiarity of the distant 'alien' cinematic landscapes and scenarios I described above is just as much part of the mundane mediated process of identity-formation as the rhetorical forms of address that bind identity to (national) locality. It is not as though these distantiated images act as a direct counterpoise to the processes Billig describes; but they clearly do have a significant role in the constitution of imagined belonging. To take one 'banal' example, we could consider the dress code of the young people pouring into the multiplex – the 'American-international' sportswear that is almost the uniform of a globalized youth culture.⁶ Work done to anchor identity to the nation thus has to be seen *as work*: as a process which does not unfold effortlessly out of a popular culture securely rooted in geographical place. Rather it is achieved against the grain of a broader tendency for imaginary identification fairly effortlessly to escape the constructed boundaries of locality.

Global Food and Local Identity

Modern lived culture is not, of course, *exclusively* mediated culture and there are other ways in which deterritorialization may be experienced. For instance, Raymond Williams pointed out the international provenance of the food his couple put on their dinner table in the early 1980s. Today they will find an even wider range of 'foreign' foods on the shelves of the supermarkets. Some of these – pastas and pizzas for example – have long since ceased to be regarded as unusual and are now marketed on a mass scale as everyday family foods, while on the other hand there has been a huge expansion in the range of foods marketed precisely on their attraction as exotic: Mexican tacos, Thai curries, Italian ciabatta and polenta, Swedish gravadlax, and so on. And in addition, of course, imported fruit and vegetables, both familiar and exotic, are now more or less constantly available, regardless of season.

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One obvious way in which this transformation in British food culture could be interpreted is in terms of the globalization of the food industry itself, beginning with what Jack Goody (1997) refers to as the global production of 'Industrial Food'. Goody shows how developments in preserving, mechanization, retailing and transport during the nineteenth century transformed the diet of the mass of the population in the West by making available an 'industrial cuisine' of mass-produced food often sourced from the colonies and former colonies. Examples like the rise of the beef canning industry at places like Fray Bentos in Uruguay show how this industrialization transformed the diets of the First World and the economies of the countries of the Third World as they became 'geared to supplying those ingredients on a mass scale' – and later how these Third World countries *themselves* came increasingly to rely upon industrial food (Goody 1997: 338).

This process has of course grown immensely in both its scope and its technical sophistication in the twentieth century and generated economic dependencies in the Third World that have been widely criticized (see for example, George 1982; Goodman and Redclift 1991; Tansey and Worsley 1995) not just in terms of relations of economic domination, but also in their environmental effects. Such critiques have now made evident the connections between the provision of an increasing consumer choice in the affluent West, and conditions forced upon workers in the transnational agribusinesses that produce the Zimbabwean mange-tout peas, the Kenyan runner beans, the Guatemalan carnations and so on.

In cultural terms there has also been plenty of discussion of the 'abstraction' of consumption in the West from production in the Third World: the way in which the complex connectivity of the global food industry causes these commodities to appear, as Marx might have put it, 'as if by magic' on the shelves of our local store. David Harvey, for instance, discusses the rise of a global food culture as an example of 'time-space compression': the way in which, on supermarket shelves or in the range of ethnic restaurants to be found in any moderate-sized western city, 'the whole world's cuisine is now assembled in one place'. This cultural assembly, he suggests, is a parallel to the assembly of images of the world available via television or in theme parks. Following Baudrillard, he thinks of global food culture as part of a range of 'simulacra' by which we now 'experience the world's geography vicariously'. But, he adds, this occurs, 'in such a way as to conceal almost perfectly any trace of origin, of the labour processes that produced them, or of the social

relations implicated in their production' (Harvey 1989: 300). Susan Willis expands on the theme of abstraction and commodity mystification in her fascinating analysis of the ambience of the supermarket. For example, she links the themes of refrigeration, chilling and air-conditioning as they are experienced in the walk around the supermarket aisles, with the temperature control used in shipping technologies that brings tropical fruit to us:

Maintained in a constant bath of refrigerated air, these fruits are incapable of producing scents, harbouring bugs, growing moulds, and becoming decayed. Air conditioning is a medium of abstraction which severs the agricultural production of the Third World from the heat of labour and the heat of the marketplace . . . It swaddles the product in First World antiseptic purity and severs the connection with the site of production. The shopper who enters the air-conditioned supermarket and chooses between its papayas, mangoes, pineapples, bananas . . . is as unaware of the factors and labour force behind their production as the tourist whose experience of Mexico is in an air conditioned hotel lobby. (Willis 1991: 51)

But, important as this sort of abstraction is in cultural-political terms, I want to focus on another order of abstraction – that involved in the severance of the experience of food from the experience of the locality of the consumer. So the question is, how does the simple wide availability of all these 'global foods' – pastas, pizzas, burgers, curries, chillies, stir-fries, kebabs – as everyday diet options contribute to the general experience of deterritorialization for our hypothetical British consumers?

We might suppose that it has clearly undermined, for most people, a strong sense of connection between the food they eat and their immediate cultural location: Indian take-aways now outnumber fish and chip shops in Britain (James 1996: 81). However the issue is a complicated one since it rests upon the assumption that there is a fairly simple relationship between diet, cuisine and sense of cultural belonging in the first place. However this is a problematic assumption. As Bell and Valentine argue, there is no easy *essential* connection here, and the marking of locational belonging by reference to food habits is largely built upon cultural mythologies, concealing complex syncretic histories:

[T]here is no essential *national* food; the food we think of as characterising a particular place always tells stories of movement and mixing . . . all there is is a menu of naturalised foods . . . modified, adapted

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and hybridised over time. Furthermore, the foodstuffs we think of as definitionally part of a particular nation's sense of identity often hides complex histories of trade links, cultural exchange, and especially colonialism. (Bell and Valentine 1997: 169)

Apart from this big question of the constant historical flux of food (as of all other) culture, it is clearly difficult in a multicultural, multi-ethnic society like Britain in the 1990s to represent the 'traditional' national diet as roast beef, suet puddings, fish and chips, tea and cucumber sandwiches. For *whose* traditions are we talking about? And this question applies not only to the ethnic mix of national populations but also to class-related differentials in diet.

However, given all of these caveats, there remains a significant transformation to be accounted for here, linking food culture with the progress of global modernity. In the first place we can understand this as a continuation and acceleration of the process of the simultaneous industrialization and globalization of food that Goody records. These industrial processes – canning, drying, freezing, packaging – mark a significant *material* rupture in the routine sourcing of foodstuffs which is surely a part of the general process of 'disembedding'. Before these institutional-technological developments, there was obviously a far greater reliance on locally produced food. Exotic imports were mostly restricted to the luxury commodities – available to a small elite – that were relatively easy to preserve in transit: tea or spices for example. So globalization, from its early impact, does clearly undermine a close *material* relationship between provenance of food and locality. And this particular transformation of modernity must surely have been generally counted as a good thing: an improvement in diet, not only in terms of variety, but of constant availability.

However these advances have also had a more ambiguous cultural impact. For today the year-round availability of imported fresh foods (along with the increasing use of processed foods) dissolves what might be seen as a positive, particular connection between diet and locality determined precisely by *restriction* – by the *limits* of availability of local produce. Conditions of constant undifferentiated supply do away with the limited availability of fruits and vegetables 'in season' and so weaken the subtle connection between climate, season, locality and cultural practice. Prior to the industrialization of food, as Delamont reminds us, 'Harvest time, lambing, the start of the hen's laying season, the arrival of the first fruits of summer and so on were the determinants of diet' throughout Europe (Delamont

1995: 28ff). And so the rhythms, anticipations and differentiations of a 'food calendar' of summer abundance, provision for winter shortages, Harvest Festivals, Christmas and Easter specialities, that contribute to a sharp particular sense of local culture are at risk of disappearance.

In the second place we have to be able to account for the impact of the striking *acceleration* of the industrialization-globalization of food in the supermarket culture of the last thirty years. Here I think we can detect something quite new: a different *order* of transition in which deterritorialization works *on the ground of the myths of food culture*, as much as on actual consumption practices. What I mean by this is that the very cultural stereotypes that identify food with, say, national culture become weakened. Take the example of roast beef and 'Britishness'. Though this is clearly, in the multicultural Britain of the 1990s, an identity preserved more at the level of myth rather than of actual practice, it none the less continues to have some degree of cultural purchase. This is evident, for example, in the continuing 'risk crisis' of the infection of the British beef herd with BSE and the possibilities of transmission of a form of the disease (CJDV) to humans. Reactions to this crisis seem to demonstrate something more than just anxieties about health risks (Lupton 1996), bringing to the surface insecurities in national identity. Evidence of this can be found in the popular-media representation of the European Union ban on British beef exports as more than just an economic threat, as part of a wider popular discourse of British culture under siege from the hostile distanced forces of Brussels bureaucrats. The recent (1997) British government ban on the sale of 'beef on the bone' has prompted further expressions of the resilience of this food-identity myth. For instance, examples of the deliberate flouting of the legislation by some butchers and restaurateurs was rationalized as defiance not just of the state's intrusion into 'civil liberties', but of its attack on a 'tradition' linking the stereotyped bluff independence of the English character with the 'cultural rights' to a traditional diet of beef ('Beefeaters', 'John Bull' and so forth).

And yet we have to place this sort of reaction in a context in which the eating of 'British beef' is now just a small part of an otherwise entirely *pluralized* food culture in Britain, demonstrated in supermarket food, in the range of cosmopolitan cookery books to be found near the checkouts, in the burgeoning quantity of ethnic or 'hybrid' restaurants. Stephen Mennell puts the cultural implications of this point very well when he says that this 'culinary pluralism is the counterpart of something which is more familiar in the arts: the loss

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of a single dominant style' (Mennell 1985, quoted in Lunt and Livingstone 1992: 98). This, I think is a key point. The 'traditional' British diet of 'roast beef dinners', fish and chips and jam roly-poly has not disappeared. However, whereas up until the 1950s and 1960s it may have formed a fairly uniform 'style' for the mass of the population, today it exists as a consumption choice amongst a wide range of others. The connection between such foods and a particular 'British way of life', it may then be argued, is at the very least attenuated – remains only in the sense of an explicit lifestyle *choice* amongst others – 'eating British' as opposed to eating American, Italian, Chinese, Thai, Spanish or Indian; Harry Ramsden's as opposed to McDonalds or Prêt à Manger.⁷ And this is not just a matter of the 'style' of social-recreational eating – 'eating out'. It is also evident in some of the best-selling practical cookery books of the 1990s, aimed at an expanding market which takes cosmopolitan food for granted as everyday convenient options. A good example is Nigel Slater's *The 30 Minute Cook*, subtitled *The best of the world's quick cooking*. Slater's style is one that demonstrates (and appeals to) an easy, taken-for-granted familiarity with a wide range of different ethnic ingredients and food styles. For instance, eschewing authenticity in favour of a no-nonsense, 'please yourself' eclecticism, he writes: 'Does it really matter that I eat my spiced lentils on naan bread with a knife and fork like beans on toast? [or] if I choose to eat my Chinese noodles with a spoon and fork, Italian style, rather than dribbling juice down my chin and over the table using chopsticks?' (Slater 1994: 9). What is striking about this is the underlying assumption of a *routine* cosmopolitan taste in his readers, extending to the slight anxiety that some may have scruples about preserving the cultural authenticity of *alien* eating styles even within their everyday domestic cuisine. This is, surely, worlds away from any simple assumption of food reinforcing national identity.

The way such mundane cosmopolitan eclecticism 'eats into' the myth of national food might even be thought of in broader terms, as an instance of the transformation of 'tradition' in reflexive modernity. The equation of 'Beef and Britishness' in the 1990s is thus at a double jeopardy: from the threats of contamination of the beef herd with BSE – signalling a symbolic 'contamination' of the myth of national purity; but, more significantly, from the precarious nature of food-identity myths themselves. In the context of the plurality of style that Mennell identifies, food-nation identifications surely exist today not as an unexamined 'second nature', but as 'self-conscious traditions' – traditions, as Giddens (1990: 38) puts it, 'in sham clothing'.

This sort of generalization has, of course, to recognize different levels of specificity in different national-cultural – and even regional – contexts. The impact of accelerating deterritorializing forces today may be experienced less forcefully in countries – or even cities – where food culture has been historically more eclectic and open to influence: for instance in the long-standing hybrid mix of street food associated with an integrating mercantile tradition and waves of colonial migration that Hannerz (1996) describes in the case of Amsterdam. This case contrasts sharply with the deep and persistent investment of cultural/'spiritual' significance in a symbolic staple that can be seen in the centrality of rice eating to Japanese cultural identity as described by Ohnuki-Tierney (1993) (Bell and Valentine 1997: 179–81). However, despite these differing historical contexts of the receiving cultures, it remains clear that deterritorializing forces are present in the food culture of all western nations and are rapidly spreading to the more affluent sectors of the Third World (Classen 1996).

In common with the other aspects of deterritorialization we have mentioned, the transformation in food culture involves a complex mixture of experienced benefits and costs. Few probably would choose to return to the monotonous, unimaginative and probably rather unhealthy British diet – and, indeed, the periodic food shortages – of earlier days (Drummond and Wilbraham 1991). In the 1990s, only those very few who attempt to be self-sufficient or to rely only on locally produced fresh foods experience what was once a regular feature of food culture – the 'hunger gap' in spring after many of the stored foods had run out and before the new season's crops arrive. And along with this increasing availability and choice in food there might – although this is admittedly a hopeful speculation – also have been a certain breakdown in cultural insularity: as food prejudices (foreign muck!) gradually dissolve, so might broader chauvinisms and even perhaps elements of the hostility to the cultural practices of ethnic minorities.

But on the other hand the globalization of the food industry, as it shifts the locus of control from the local to the global, introduces new areas of anxiety and uncertainty. For example, the general sense of risk involved in consumption has certainly increased – from periodic crises over contamination of the food chain ('Chernobyl lamb', 'BSE beef', new strains of influenza species-migrating from Chinese chickens in Hong Kong, new strains of the *E. coli* bacterium appearing in Scotland, antibiotic-resistant American maize products) to the background uncertainty about the widespread use of pesticides in

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agribusiness, food irradiation and other preservative methods. Perceptions of food risk are of course scarcely restricted to modern globalized societies. The risk of food poisoning through ignorance about hygiene was endemic in pre-modern societies, and the deliberate adulteration of food by suppliers dates back at least to ancient Greek and Roman societies (Goody 1997: 351).

But what is new is both the loss of local control over food and diet and the way this periodically becomes culturally marked as a 'crisis' – a threat to the normality of life lived amongst distanced 'expert systems' (chapter 2). A good example of this was Oprah Winfrey's famous address to her afternoon chat show audience in April 1996, on being told of the practice of feeding rendered cattle remains to beef cows, and the consequent risks of BSE in American herds: 'Now, doesn't that all concern you a little bit? It has stopped me cold from eating another hamburger. Stopped me cold!' (quoted in Coles 1998: 3). Oprah Winfrey's remark – famously credited with precipitating a collapse in the sale of beef in the United States and the subject of a high-profile law suit – could be read as a rupture in the routine trust relations of global modernity that, without too much exaggeration, can be compared with the incidence of sudden 'catastrophic' financial crises. For if it is no longer safe to eat hamburgers – more than the US cultural equivalent of roast beef – then what can we trust?

Indeed incidents such as this (which incidentally also illustrate the complex intertwining of the cultural with the other dimensions of global modernity) need to be seen as irruptions out of a more chronic background process of the precarious negotiation of trust relations with distanced expert systems. Another example of this is the issue of the use of genetically produced foodstuffs – tomatoes and tomato paste, soya – as they are gradually being introduced into supermarkets in the United States and Europe. Witness here the growth of the practice of providing product information leaflets about such controversial products in supermarkets as a means of reassuring consumers. And, indeed, such anxieties have also contributed to various practices of 're-embedding' in food culture: for example the organic farming movement oriented to local production and delivery ('local box schemes'), the search for alternatives to supermarket shopping, food co-operatives and so on (Belasco 1993).

Without extending this discussion any further, I think it can plausibly be argued that a distinct mode of deterritorialized cultural experience exists across a range of everyday activities in late twentieth-century 'developed' industrial societies like Britain.

Although, as we have seen, it has different aspects, a central defining characteristic of deterritorialization is the weakening or dissolution of the connection between everyday lived culture and territorial location. However this is not typically experienced as simply cultural loss or estrangement but as a complex and ambiguous blend: of familiarity and difference, expansion of cultural horizons and increased perceptions of vulnerability, access to the 'world out there' accompanied by penetration of our own private worlds, new opportunities and new risks.

But what I have also tried to stress is the *mundane* nature of this experience. It seems to me that, for all that these are profound transformations in cultural experience, they are not, typically, experienced as dramatic upheavals but are, on the contrary, rapidly assimilated to normality and grasped – however precariously – as 'the way life is' rather than as a series of deviations from the way life has been or ought to be. To this extent, some of the attempts to describe the general experience of cultural modernity – for example Marshall Berman's (1982) images of the dissolution – the 'melting' – of cultural solidity taken from Marx, or the imagery of the modern maelstrom or the "*tourbillon social*" taken from Rousseau, are rather misleading in their dramatization. Whilst they may describe the *conditions* of (global) modern social experience, it seems to me that the experience itself is (in the West at least) generally rather less fraught or dramatic, the rapidity of transformations – even the intermittent 'crises' – something which ordinary people often take in their cultural stride.

Objections to Deterritorialization

Having sketched some aspects of what might count as deterritorialization, I want now to address some objections that could be raised, both to the idea itself and to its broad general application to the analysis of cultural globalization.

The Myth of Pre-modern Localism

The first of these objections relates to the principal grounding assumption of the concept itself: *deterritorialization* obviously assumes the existence of a close connection between culture and location prior to the globalization process. But this is perhaps in certain ways

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disputable. Morley and Robins (1995) for instance point to a critical literature in anthropology which questions what might be called the 'localist bias' of the discipline,⁸ born to some extent out of the exigencies of its fieldwork methods. This localism consists of a set of assumptions about the boundedness, 'rootedness', insularity and 'purity' of (particularly) pre-modern cultures. Morley and Robins cite challenges to such assumptions in, for example, James Clifford's arguments (which we encountered in chapter 1) that cultures need to be seen as 'travelling cultures' which 'negotiate themselves in external as much as internal relations' (Clifford 1992, cited in Morley and Robins 1995: 129) – as much as collectivities 'centred' on the villages that field anthropologists tend to study. Implicit in this is a criticism of the connotation of the term 'native' with the idea of fixity of location, something Arjun Appadurai unequivocally rejects: 'natives, people confined to and by the places to which they belong, groups unsullied by contact with a larger world, have probably never existed' (quoted in Morley and Robins 1995: 128).

As Morley and Robins summarize them, the broader implications of this critique of anthropological localism are that we should reject all images of 'pure, internally homogeneous, authentic, indigenous culture[s]' and recognize that 'every culture has, in fact, ingested foreign elements from exogenous sources, with the various elements gradually becoming "naturalized" within it' (pp. 129–30).

This is a valid and important criticism which, as we shall see later, also has significance for the way in which cultural hybridity is formulated. Its force in the present context is to make us sensitive to the possible implication that deterritorialization involves a fall from grace from an original, innocent 'natural' relationship between culture and place. Indeed our use of García Canclini's formulation – 'the loss of the "natural" relation of culture to geographical and social territories' – might seem particularly culpable in this respect, were it not for the significant scare quotes.

However, I think this is an implication that we can avoid. The deterritorialization that we have instanced certainly implies a movement away from a prior state in which cultural experience was linked more closely to place, but this need not involve the sort of myths of indigenism that are rightly criticized. Where this criticism has most force is in the retrospective theoretical gaze across the divide between modernity and 'tradition'. And, while it is true that the theory of global modernity based in time-space distancing attributes greater constraints of place on social interaction, and so more local determinations of cultural experience in pre-modern

societies, as we saw in chapter 2, this is not incompatible with a recognition of the (often remarkable) relative mobility of sections of these societies. So to talk of close links between culture and territory does not mean to imply insularity or to discount exogenous influence as, more or less, constants of cultural practice and experience. But the point, nevertheless, is that these were different *orders* of society in which some of the 'openness to the world' available to us was simply not a possibility. 'Locality' in the sense of the significance of local physical environments and climates, features of landscape, customs and practices, linguistic dialects, food culture, particular inflections of wider religious belief systems and so on clearly *did* figure much larger in such cultures. In resisting myths of indigenism we must not go to the other extreme and discount all these obvious examples of the significance of locality within pre-modern societies.

To this extent, then, deterritorialization does seem to me a valid way of grasping a mode of cultural experience which is *particular* to global modernity and distinct from the *general* properties of fluidity, mobility and interactivity that can be attributed to all historical cultures. It may be further objected that the instances of deterritorialization we considered above are, in any case, very much contemporary ones – movements *within* modern societies rather than examples which span the modernity/pre-modernity distinction. Does this in any way compromise the theory of modernity as a globalizing epoch marked off against previous ones? Well, I don't think so. To think of deterritorialization as something particular to modern societies is to see it as a cultural condition *set in train* by the transition to social modernity. This does not, however, imply that modernity is an accomplished process, and it makes more sense to see it as an ongoing, developing one, in Therborn's sense of epoch as an expanse 'open at all ends' (chapter 2). So the changes we have noted can be seen as evidence of the accelerating pace of globalization transforming our own modern cultural localisms. The concept of deterritorialization is at once, then, a way of theorizing the underlying 'enabling conditions' of global-modern culture, and of describing and making sense of the empirical cultural phenomena which face us in the perplexingly rapid transformations of our stage of modernity.

The Unevenness of Deterritorialization

But there is another important set of questions that can be posed to the idea of deterritorialization and these centre on asking *whose* experience we are describing? Who partakes of globalized culture and

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who is excluded from it? Is the idea of deterritorialization in fact in any useful way generalizable?

In following the imagined trajectory of Williams's caricatured cosmopolitans – affluent, educated (white?), western, middle-class, 'information-rich' – we have hardly taken a broad section across socio-economic position and cultural experience. There is a risk, then, that talk of deterritorialized experience may be rather exclusive. This point is made very well by Doreen Massey, who argues that there is a distinct 'power geometry' to globalization in which 'some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don't; some are more on the receiving-end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it' (Massey 1994: 149). The privileged players in the globalization process for Massey are, 'the jet-setters, the ones sending and receiving the faxes and the e-mails, holding the international conference calls . . .' But against this elite group, Massey contrasts all those vast numbers who are affected by globalization but not in control of the process, from labour migrants and favela dwellers in the Third World to 'The pensioner in a bed-sit in an inner city in this country, eating British working-class-style fish and chips from a Chinese take-away, watching a US film on a Japanese television, and not daring to go out after dark. And anyway the public transport's been cut' (Massey 1994: 149).

Globalization is an *uneven* process, not just in that it involves 'winners and losers' or that it reproduces many familiar configurations of domination and subordination, but also in the sense that the cultural experience it distributes is highly complex and varied. It is important, then, not to mistake one narrow band of cultural experience for the whole of it, by becoming fascinated (a particular temptation, as Massey hints, for academics) with the technology and the associated lifestyle available to the 'information-rich'. A similar caveat is issued by Morley and Robins who argue that for some social groups, without access to new technologies of communication and transport, modernity, far from offering a widening of horizons may actually involve a narrowing and localizing of experience, 'as their life chances are gradually reduced and they increasingly remain stuck in the micro-territories in which they were born' (1995: 219). Moreover the example they have in mind is not that of isolated British pensioners, but American Black and Latino youths – as represented in films like John Singleton's *Boyz n the Hood*, for whom 'locality is in fact destiny, where the horizon, far from being global, extends only as far as the boundary of "the Hood"' (ibid.).

As Doreen Massey stresses, these are not simply moral/political

points but *conceptual* ones. For unless there is some basic level at which the idea of deterritorialization generalizes across various social, economic and geographical divisions, it loses a lot of its power and interest as an approach to the cultural implications of globalization. If deterritorialization is *only* a description of the experiences of the affluent, mobile and information-rich sectors of the most economically developed parts of the world, it does not thereby become an invalid cultural description, but, in one sense, it loses much of its claim to be a description of *globalized* cultural experience. For ought not globalization to be global in its scope?

Well, I think these objections *can* be answered in a way that preserves, though within certain limits, the more or less general applicability of the idea of deterritorialization. In the first place we can readily agree with the main thrust of this sort of criticism – that globalization in all its aspects is an uneven process: privileging some, disadvantaging others, reproducing old and introducing new patterns of domination and subordination. But notice that this is to recognize that globalization has a basic *applicability* to most people living in the world today. Massey's argument about the 'power geometry' of globalization, for instance, is not about people being excluded (exempt?) from the process, but about the differential access to control over events *within* the process.

If this is so with the political economy of globalization, it is also true about its cultural aspect. We can recognize that deterritorialization is extremely wide in its applicability whilst being uneven in its effects. Thus, to take social differentiations (of race, class, gender and age) within developed societies, it is clear that some are going to live a deterritorialized culture more intensely, actively and (on balance) enjoyably than others. The distance between Williams's 'yuppie' couple and Massey's pensioner is illustrative of this. But it would be a mistake to see the experience of deterritorialization as something which only arrives at a certain threshold of socio-economic advantage, above which is a switch to the 'hyper-space' of a 'cosmopolitan' lifestyle and below which there is a simple exclusion from the whole process of globalization and a different *order* of experience.

This sort of mistake is liable to be made where we over-emphasize the *technologies* of globalization – where, for example, we think of it as something that can be 'bought into' by purchasing the latest communicational hardware (and software). But, as we have tried to emphasize, the use of such technologies is only a part of what deterritorialization involves. Just as significant might be, for instance,

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the experience of the transformation of the local cultural environment brought about by the closure of old heavy industrial plants in working-class areas as such industries relocate to other parts of the world. Or, as part of the same process, the 'placing in' of new industries with different work cultures into these same areas (Japanese car plants in European countries). Or again, the transformation of a predominantly white working-class district into a multi-ethnic one brought about by labour immigration. All of these examples will involve aspects of the removal of cultural experience from local determinations, but none is directly connected with the use of communications technology and, clearly, none is an experience which is 'bought into' at a certain level of affluence. In this regard, we might consider that a white British person in a multi-ethnic working-class community may have as much direct contact with global food culture by shopping in the local Asian store which has replaced the 'corner shop', as a middle-class person cruising the ethnic foods aisle in Sainsbury's or Waitrose.

A second point to make in relation to the access to technology issue is that, arguably, deterritorialization is associated with relatively low levels of technological development which are now very widely distributed (in the developed world at least) and so part of daily life for the majority. So those excluded on this count would be the tiny proportion who never make a phone call or never watch TV. This is a point Dick Hebdige makes:

We are living in a world where 'mundane cosmopolitanism' is part of 'ordinary' experience. All cultures, however remote temporally and geographically, are becoming accessible today as signs and/or commodities. If we don't choose to go and visit other cultures they come and visit us as images and information on TV . . . Nobody has to be educated, well-off or adventurous to be a world traveller at this level. In the 1990s everybody – willingly or otherwise, whether conscious or not – is more or less cosmopolitan. (Hebdige 1990: 20)

Without exaggerating the potential of this 'mundane cosmopolitanism' we can at least agree that even those marginalized groups for whom 'locality is destiny' experience a *transformed* locality into which the wider world intrudes more and more. They may in all sorts of ways be the 'losers' in globalization, but this does not mean that they are excluded from its effects, that they are consigned to cultural backwaters out of the mainstream of global modernity. Quite to the contrary, it seems to me that the poor and marginalized – for example

those living in inner-city areas – often find themselves daily closest to some of most turbulent transformations, while it is the affluent who can afford to retire to the rural backwaters which have at least the appearance of a preserved and stable 'locality'.

So, to summarize, I think it can plausibly be argued that deterritorialization in western developed societies is not an experience exclusive to the most privileged groups, but involves a certain basic level of commonality. Disadvantage within globalization may be experienced in many ways, including that involved in 'information poverty', but it doesn't imply exclusion from the underlying cultural transformations which lift lived experience out of its rootedness in localities. Furthermore as we have argued throughout, the experience of deterritorialization is a deeply ambiguous one, mixing empowerment with vulnerability, opportunity with risk, in complex combinations. It should not therefore be thought of as a simple issue of access or resource distribution in relation to a set of incontestable social goods.

This of course all refers to the experience of the 'First World'. But the question of the unevenness of globalization clearly has sharp relevance for the cultural experience of people in the Third World – many millions of whom indeed have never made a phone call, never watched TV. Are things utterly different here? Can it convincingly be argued that these people – the majority of the world's population after all – experience a deterritorialized culture which has anything in common with that experienced in the 'developed' world?

Well, this raises many complex and difficult questions, some of which go beyond our present scope. In the first place, there is a whole range of vexed empirical issues involved, which extend to definitions of what today counts as the 'Third World'. The concept itself is now in some senses an unstable one as a result of globalization and uneven patterns of economic development. For example, it is often observed that the developmental trajectory of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of the Third World – the 'Asian Tigers' or Latin American countries like Brazil and Mexico – make them now scarcely comparable with those of some of the poorest countries in the world – Chad, Mauritania, Bangladesh and so on. The degree to which one might think of the Third World as becoming integrated into global modernity (in both political economic and cultural terms) clearly depends on where along this wide continuum one would place its contemporary centre of gravity.

But against examples of recent rapid development often instanced

as evidence of current economic growth, much more (1996) reflects a complex and moving first consideration that – from the sub-elites – is the extent of this clear deterritorialization.

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as evidence of the fruits of globalization, we would have to place the current economic crises in many of the Asian NICs, along with the much more sceptical accounts of theorists like Hirst and Thompson (1996) referred to in chapter 3. In short, the situation is inherently complex and fluid. To add to these complexities (particularly in moving from political economy to culture) we would need to consider that the range of lived experience within Third World societies – from subsistence farmers in remote rural areas to affluent urban elites – is obviously far greater than in the developed West, even to the extent of spanning the modernity/'pre-modernity' divide. All this clearly makes generalization about the common experience of deterritorialization a rather risky business.

But, picking our way cautiously, we can, I think, assume the following. First, that at present substantial sectors of populations in the Third World *are* in effect excluded from the broad experience of the globalization process. Indicators such as the United Nations Human Development Index, which combine measures such as literacy, educational attainment, longevity and utility derived from income (Thomas et al. 1994: 22) clearly show how great the gulf is between the life experience of those in countries at the top of the scale (like Canada) and those at the bottom (like Guinea). And we scarcely need to consult these data to realize that for many millions in regions like sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia, life simply does not involve any of the routine experiences of deterritorialization that we have described in relation to the developed world. Indeed the sorts of cultural anxieties described in relation to deterritorialization seem rather trivial when compared to the global coexistence of millions of lives lived at 'subsistence' levels. Here I think 'threshold' arguments do probably apply.

But on the other hand we have to avoid building an unrealistic picture of the contemporary Third World as *predominantly* isolated, marginalized, rural, 'pre-modern'. For even in the rural economy we would have to place alongside subsistence farmers those large numbers of agricultural workers employed in transnational 'agribusiness' in the Third World. Such people are clearly in one sense integrated into global modernity, work with its industrial technology, have distanced relations with the ultimate determinants of their livelihood, are part of the production base of global capitalism. Of course an important part of the critique of global capitalism lies in recognizing that such people's 'involvement' may be little more than as (exploited) workers. The agribusiness operatives who may suffer health problems from the effects of the intensive chemical

farming used to produce the foodstuffs in European and North American supermarkets probably don't shop in supermarkets themselves. None the less, they are no doubt acutely aware of the distanced forces that control their livelihoods.

One interesting instance of this awareness is found in Mark Phillips's fascinating (1997) film *Mange Tout*⁹ which documents the economic-cultural linkages established through the production of mangetout peas on a Zimbabwean farm growing the vegetable on a prized exclusive contract for the British supermarket chain Tesco. One of the revealing aspects of this film was the relative levels of information about, or ignorance of, the other displayed by the producers and consumers. As might be expected, the supermarket shoppers interviewed had hardly any idea where the peas originated, or indeed of where Zimbabwe actually was, and scarcely any interest in the conditions of production of the commodity. By contrast, the farm workers interviewed showed a sharp sense of the distanced exchange relationship which is central to their lives. This extended from a subtle sense of the hierarchy of demand to be satisfied in the transnational operation and the importance of maintaining the exacting standards of quality of the product 'demanded' by the unseen consumer, to a sophisticated awareness of the importance of bringing foreign exchange into the Zimbabwean economy. But there was also evident a rich, imaginative mythical construction of what life for the inhabitants of the 'Kingdom of Tesco' to the north must be like, which contrasted sharply with the relative imaginative poverty of the British consumers. As with subordinate groups in the First World, then, disadvantage here is not a matter of exclusion from globalization, but of being unequally positioned within it. And this 'inequality' does not work itself out in a way that maps cultural-imaginary resources neatly on to economic advantage.

At this level of 'involvement' in globalization however, one could still argue that there is little comparison between the mundane cultural experiences of the First and Third Worlds. But then we would have to broaden our imagination of what the Third World is today to include the rapid growth of urbanization and industrialization, and the availability and use of communications technologies found there. Trends towards urbanization suggest that by the year 2000 half the population of the world will be living in cities, and this is expected to rise to two-thirds by the year 2020 (Thomas et al. 1994: 70; see also Vidal 1996: 4). This pattern is clearly going to make most impact in the Third World, where already most of the world's

largest cities are located. Of course, the economies of these countries, and the sectors which are growing, are very different. The access to modern technology is a huge gap by household (World Bank 1991), the technology is not the same (Abercrombie 1991), a slow growth on the horizon (Thompson 1991).

Now of course, the long-term future depends not the casual closing of the gap, but on a 'informatic' try to argue dependent general parts of the those expected the sort of couple won't be in Bombay, S. 1991 alone, applicability.

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largest cities in terms of population are to be found. And this trend is of course connected with the movement away from wholly agrarian economies and towards employment in the industrial and service sectors which is a feature, though at different rates, of all Third World countries. To this can be added a trend towards steadily increasing access to media technologies like television. Although there remains a huge gap between the virtual saturation of television ownership by households in the most developed countries and the radically sparser distribution in the developing world (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1991), the *rate* at which ownership of communications and media technologies is growing there is none the less rapid (Winseck 1997; Abercrombie 1996: 75). And underlying all this, there is evidence of a slow general improvement in levels of development as measured on the Human Development Index in nearly all developing countries (Thomas et al. 1994: 73).

Now of course all this must be qualified by saying that such general long-term trends may disguise all sorts of current and (possibly) future disparities. Globalization does not imply levelling out. It is not the case that gaps between the First and Third World are gradually closing, and there remain all manner of structural inequalities involved at the level of political economy, access to technologies, 'information poverty' and so on. It would clearly be foolish, then, to try to argue for comparability in cultural experience if this is simply dependent on an argument about gradually converging levels of general material affluence or standard of living. *Some* sectors in *some* parts of the Third World *do* have comparable standards of living to those experienced by affluent groups in countries like the UK, and the sort of lifestyle described in relation to our hypothetical British couple would not be entirely alien to many other affluent couples in Bombay, São Paulo, Seoul or Mexico City. But this sort of comparison alone will obviously not support the claim to the general global applicability of deterritorialized cultural experience.

However, neither does it have to. For, beyond the 'threshold point' recognized earlier, what is at stake in experiencing deterritorialized culture is not, crucially, level of affluence, but leading a life which, as a result of the various forces of global modernity, is 'lifted off' its connection with locality. This is not something restricted to the populations of the First World. And, indeed, it is possible to argue that some populations in the contemporary Third World may, precisely because of their positioning within the uneven process of globalization, actually have a sharper, more acute experience of deterritorialization than those in the First World.

Deterritorialization at the 'Margins'

To illustrate this I want to focus on some of the arguments of the Mexican cultural theorist Néstor García Canclini, whose definition of deterritorialization we adopted (and slightly adapted) at the beginning of this chapter.

What is particularly interesting about García Canclini's work is that it approaches the complexities of Latin American cultures¹⁰ not from the familiar perspective of dependency models, but in terms of a global modernity in which these societies are ambiguously located: 'where traditions have not yet disappeared and modernity has not completely arrived' (García Canclini 1995: 1). García Canclini encapsulates this ambiguity – which, as we shall see later, he grasps in various senses as cultural *hybridity* – in the following question: 'How can we understand the presence of indigenous crafts and vanguard art catalogs on the same coffee table? What are painters looking for when, in the same painting, they cite pre-Columbian and colonial images along with those of the culture industry, and then reelaborate them using computers and lasers?' (1995: 2).

This is not the Third World in which pre-modernity is starkly and irreconcilably juxtaposed with modernity: the urban enclave against the vast unchanging rural hinterland, a cultural version of the 'structural duality' argument (Cardoso 1982) in which peasant and urbanite confront each other as though across history in mutual incomprehension. Rather, García Canclini is trying to understand the sort of culture that arises precisely out of the rapid if uneven growth of urbanization, industrialization and mass communications that is dissolving sharp distinctions between rural and urban culture and making these societies the sites of so much literal and metaphorical movement and encounter. These are societies in which tradition and modernity have a complicated, forced coexistence at all sorts of levels: from the bricolage of *objets d'art* in middle-class living rooms, to that of migrant street vendors who, 'install their baroque stands of regional candies and contraband radios, medicinal herbs and videocassettes' on city street corners – cultural as well as geographical 'intersections' (1995: 3).

In interpreting this cultural experience, García Canclini rejects the sort of thinking that maps the modernity-tradition relationship on to a core-periphery model ('the abstract expression of an idealised imperial system' (1995: 232)), in favour of a view of modernity as, 'a condition that involves us [all] in the cities and in the country-

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side, in the metropolises and in the underdeveloped countries' (1995: 268). Thus when he speaks of deterritorialization, although he describes phenomena which are in certain senses specific to the Latin American context, he none the less refers these to an underlying *condition* which is recognizable as the common source of deterritorialized cultural experience in both the 'developing' and the 'developed' worlds.

Central to García Canclini's understanding of deterritorialization in Latin America is a fundamental sense of the literal displacement of populations in the processes of labour migration (see also Appadurai 1990): from the countryside to the city and across national borders. So, for him, the most salient sites of deterritorialized culture are those 'spaces on the border' formed by migration.

To illustrate this, García Canclini discusses some ethnographic research he conducted in Tijuana, a Mexican border city that has seen enormous population growth since the 1950s due to the influx of labour migrants from all regions of Mexico. Many of these settlers commute daily to work in the *maquiladoras* or in seasonal agricultural work across the border in the US. Others find work in the tourist industry which services the millions of American visitors who cross the border to Tijuana to 'see Mexico'. But despite its being a place of recent settlement, of transit, and of cultural intersection and 'marginality', García Canclini describes Tijuana as, 'a modern, contradictory, cosmopolitan city with a strong definition of itself'. What is interesting is that the city's self-identity is a product precisely of intense deterritorialization. García Canclini's research in Tijuana involved getting interviewees to identify places and images in the city which they judged most representative of its particular life and culture. The majority of these were

those that linked Tijuana with what lies beyond it: Revolution Avenue, its shops and tourist centers . . . the parabolic antennas, the legal and illegal passages on the border, the neighbourhoods where those from different parts of the country are concentrated . . . 'lord of the émigrés', to whom they go to ask that he arrange their 'papers' or to thank him for their not having been caught by *la migra*. (García Canclini 1995: 234–5)

García Canclini goes on to suggest that the deterritorialized nature of Tijuana culture is also found in other ways: in its bilingualism and in the way its inhabitants have, in a deliberately ironic stance, adopted as their own the ersatz cultural images that litter the tourist

city. The juxtaposition of images from all over Mexico – ‘volcanoes, Aztec figures, cacti, the eagle and the serpent’ – provided for the North American visitors make no claim to local ‘embedded’ authenticity, and yet provide a sense of what the city is for its inhabitants. Indeed García Canclini even identifies (in an interesting parallel with Giddens’s notion of ‘re-embedding’) a process of ‘reterritorialization’ by which some Tijuanaans assert their cultural ownership of the city: ‘The same people who praise the city for being open and cosmopolitan want to fix signs of identification and rituals that differentiate them from those who are just passing through, who are tourists or . . . anthropologists curious to understand intercultural crossing’ (1995: 239). The example Tijuana provides, then, is of a place where identity is complexly forged out of a ‘local’ experience dominated by its relationship to *other* places: the rest of Mexico, North America, the wider world – it is a ‘delocalized locality’.

An even more striking example of a deterritorialized locality that García Canclini gives (citing a study by R. Rouse, 1988) is of the isolated rural town of Aguililla in Michoacán province in the south-west of Mexico. Far from being a border town either physically or culturally, Aguililla has none the less been fundamentally transformed by a pattern of migration, first established in the 1940s, to California – particularly the microelectronics capital of Silicon Valley, Redwood City. As Rouse’s study indicates, the Aguilillan migrants who have found work as labourers and in the service industries there have not broken their links with Aguililla but have established and maintained a constant set of flows between their expatriate location and their place of origin. The flow of dollars has supported the declining subsistence farming economy while the labour migrants themselves either return frequently after short spells of work in the United States, or else keep in close contact with their families via the telephone. Rouse argues that these flows have created a single functioning community dispersed across space:

Through the constant migration back and forth and the growing use of telephones, the residents of Aguililla tend to be reproducing their links with people that are two thousand miles away as actively as they maintain their relations with their immediate neighbours. Still more, and more generally, through the continuous circulation of people, money, commodities, and information, the diverse settlements have intermingled with such force that they are probably better understood as forming only one community dispersed in a variety of places. (Rouse, quoted in García Canclini 1995: 232)

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Though different in many ways, Tijuana and Aguililla are none the less both prime examples of the central proposition of deterritorialization – that globalization lifts cultural life off its hitherto close connection with physical locality. They are also both instances which demonstrate that the phenomenon of deterritorialization, far from being exclusive to the centres of affluence in the West, is in certain ways experienced more sharply at the margins. And moreover, the cultures García Canclini describes in Latin America, for all their obvious subordination in the power geometry of globalization and their manifest levels of deprivation, are none the less in some senses *flourishing* cultures. One might even be tempted towards the rhetorical reversal that would place the margins at the centre of globalized culture – something García Canclini hints at when he writes: 'The hybridizations described throughout this book bring us to the conclusion that today all cultures are border cultures' (1995: 261). To see what substance there might be to such a claim we can now move on to examine the idea of hybridization, its relation to deterritorialization and its use as a category for understanding globalized culture.

Hybridization

The idea that globalized culture is hybrid culture has a strong intuitive appeal which follows directly from the notion of deterritorialization. This is because the increasing traffic between cultures that the globalization process brings suggests that the dissolution of the link between culture and place is accompanied by an intermingling of these disembedded cultural practices producing new complex hybrid forms of culture. Though not always related explicitly to the analysis of globalization, this sort of cultural complexity has been a strong theme in writings about post-colonial culture (e.g. Bhabha 1994; Young 1995) and in work on cultural identity more broadly (e.g. Hall 1992; Gilroy 1993; Dodd 1995; Hannerz 1996; Werbner and Modood 1997). Even a theorist like Anthony Smith, who, as we saw in chapter 3, argues for the continuing significance of the ethnic core of national identities admits to seeing 'signs of partial hybridization of national cultures' (Smith 1990: 188), arising from the multi-ethnic mix of most national populations.

But the idea of cultural hybridization is one of those deceptively simple-seeming notions which turns out, on examination, to have lots of tricky connotations and theoretical implications (Werbner 1997;

Papastergiadis 1997). I don't want to become deeply involved in all these here, but we shall have to clear some ground around the concept to see how useful it is for grasping the nature of globalized culture. So let's start with a quotation that establishes much of the spirit of the idea and at the same time introduces some of the problematic elements. This is from an essay by the novelist Salman Rushdie in which he defends his novel *The Satanic Verses* against the charges of blasphemy levelled against it from certain Muslim communities:

Those who oppose the novel most vociferously today are of the opinion that intermingling with different cultures will inevitably weaken and ruin their own. I am of the opposite opinion. *The Satanic Verses* celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the Pure. *Mélange*, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is *how newness enters the world*. It is the great possibility that mass migration gives the world, and I have tried to embrace it. *The Satanic Verses* is for change-by-fusion, change-by-conjoining. It is a love-song to our mongrel selves. (Rushdie 1991: 394)

The whole 'Rushdie affair' – the novel itself, the *fatwa*, the associated debates about freedom of expression, blasphemy, racism, western versus Islamic values, liberalism and fundamentalism and so on – has of course become a particular focus for the cultural politics of global modernity. But without becoming caught up in these specific issues, let us simply take Rushdie's celebration of hybridity on its own terms as a cultural position which proceeds, as he says, 'from the very experience of uprooting, disjuncture and metamorphosis . . . that is the migrant condition, and from which . . . can be derived a metaphor for all humanity' (1991: 394). The idea implicit in this, of course, and echoing García Canclini, is that the hybrid experience is increasingly the global experience.

Perhaps the most basic component of the idea of hybridity is that of simply *mixing* – intermingling, combining, fusion, *mélange*. On the face of it this is straightforward and unexceptionable – hybridity is the mingling of cultures from different territorial locations brought about by the increasing traffic amongst cultures – in Rushdie's version, as in García Canclini's, particularly the processes of migration – that global modernity produces. At this basic empirical level hybridity is a way of describing and thinking through cultural phenomena of the 'hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that' variety that seem to be proliferating. In this sense, it is an

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attempt to 'come to terms with phenomena such as Thai boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, Asian rap in London, Irish bagels, Chinese tacos . . .' (Nederveen Pieterse 1995: 53). However, beyond this simple empirical-descriptive use, the concept of hybridity, as Renato Rosaldo suggests, has two distinct polarities:

On the one hand, hybridity can imply a space betwixt and between two zones of purity in a manner that follows biological usage that distinguishes two discrete species and the hybrid pseudo-species that results from their combination. Similarly, the anthropological concept of syncretism asserts, for example, that folk Catholicism occupies a hybrid site midway between the purity of Catholicism and that of indigenous religion. On the other hand, hybridity can be understood as the ongoing condition of all human cultures, which contains no zones of purity because they undergo continuous processes of transculturation (two-way borrowing and lending between cultures). Instead of hybridity versus purity, this view suggests that it is hybridity all the way down. (Rosaldo 1995: xv)

As Rosaldo points out, the tension between these two positions frequently remains unresolved in writers who, like Rushdie and García Canclini, celebrate hybridity,¹¹ but there is very often a strong element of the first – what we can call the 'original purity' position. Thus Rushdie, in rhetorically revelling in the 'impurity' of cultural *mélange* might be taken to imply that there were once historically existing pure, original cultures out of which unruly but dynamic 'mongrel' forms emerge. He is ideologically opposed to 'the apostles of purity . . . who . . . have wrought havoc among mere mixed-up human beings', but his version of mixing seems to *imply* this sort of essentialism, if only as something that needs to be overcome. Now it is extremely likely that, being pressed, Rushdie would readily concede that no culture is ever in this pure original state, but that, of their very nature, cultures are all more or less permeable and in constant flux. The problem is that the very structure of the hybridity argument in this form seems to summon up these implicit originary myths.

And the biological imagery in the idea of the hybrid, as Rosaldo also points out, contributes to this. Hybridity is, after all, derived from notions of breeding in plants and animals and is carried over to the cultural sphere via negatively charged notions of racial mixing such as miscegenation and the more ambiguous, though still originally racially derived, notions of *mestizaje* and creolization (Hannerz 1987; Nederveen Pieterse 1995; Friedman 1994, 1995). Now, of course,

these terms are today almost always deployed in a celebratory mode deliberately intended to undermine arguments that link cultural strength and destiny with racial purity (Papastergiadis 1997). Indeed there is even the implicit reversal of this idea – the hybrid being seen as the stronger, more vigorous strain. But it might be argued that those who use the notion of hybridity to do this political-ideological work, implicitly accept and reproduce some of the unfortunate connotations of this biologically informed discourse: for instance in Rushdie's ironic acceptance of the label of 'mongrel' or his claim to be 'a bastard child of history' (1991: 394). The notion of cultural hybridity could benefit from jettisoning all this quasi-biological baggage. Jonathan Friedman takes the argument further by tracing the 'confused essentialism' of the discourses of hybridity or creolization to the inappropriate 'substantialization of culture' (Friedman 1995: 82) introduced in the metaphor of mingling itself – where cultures are imagined to 'flow' (as in bodily fluids?) together.

We can see, then, that there are all sorts of conceptual and political pitfalls attending the 'original purity' position. But what of Rosaldo's other interpretation: 'hybridity all the way down'? Clearly this view is to be preferred because it does justice to the now widely accepted view that culture is, of its 'nature', fluid, dynamic, protean, ever-changing – and at no point in history fixed, established, static.¹² This is to see the 'original' state of culture as what Werbner, following Bakhtin, calls 'organic unconscious hybridity' in which, 'despite the illusion of boundedness, cultures evolve historically through unreflective borrowings, mimetic appropriations, exchanges and inventions' (Werbner 1997: 4-5). But the question then arises of what *use* terms like hybridity are in designating something peculiar to the process of globalization. If all historical cultures have always been hybrid – well, what's new? It might be argued that globalization accelerates the process of mixing, but, as Nederveen Pieterse argues, there remains an element of tautology here: 'contemporary accelerated globalization means the hybridization of hybrid cultures.' As Nederveen Pieterse goes on to suggest, it may be that the idea of hybridization 'remains meaningful only as a critique of essentialism . . . as a counterweight to the introverted notion of culture' (Nederveen Pieterse 1995: 64).

Werbner sees a more positive distinction in counterposing 'organic hybridity' with the Bakhtinian idea of 'intentional hybridity', a deliberate deployment in linguistic and other cultural forms of a mixing intended to 'shock, change, challenge, revitalise or disrupt through deliberate intended fusions of unlike social languages and images' (1997: 5). It may be that this sort of shock aesthetic is a

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distinctive feature of some global modern cultural production, but it scarcely describes the whole gamut of contemporary cultural interpenetration. Should we infer then that the concept of cultural hybridity remains only of 'strategic' value, and is not really adequate to grasping the broad nature of deterritorialized culture? Well, let's not make our minds up yet, but first consider, briefly, one further set of problems with the idea.

These centre on the apparent neglect of the role of power relations in structuring the hybrid mix. To put it at its simplest, the metaphors of mixing and confluence tend to suggest 'equal measures' and a certain serendipity in the combination – Rushdie's 'hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that'. But the sceptical position points precisely to the unequal balance in the cultural resources that are engaged and to the familiar established hegemonies (the West, multinational capitalism) that are at work ensuring that newness, in the shape of challenges to their hegemonic positions, *doesn't* enter the world. Aijaz Ahmad is particularly sceptical of the notion of hybridity on this count. Ahmad's particular quarrel is with the way in which writers on post-colonialism, such as Rushdie and, particularly, Homi Bhabha (1994), have tried to use the idea of cultural hybridity (in the broad context of postmodern cultural theory) as a sort of ideological turning-of-the-tables on the West. This implies a privileging – in a way that recalls García Canclini's remarks about border cultures – of the migrant's displaced 'marginal' hybrid experience as the emerging *central* global experience, over that of the decaying cultural hegemony of the West. But these theoretical and discursive moves, Ahmad argues, are unconvincing since they simply fail to engage with the manifest *material* power of (western) global capitalism. Thus those who celebrate hybridity 'in theory' for its anti-essentializing stance finish up rather naively 'endors[ing] the cultural claims of transnational capitalism itself':

For it is the claim of IBM, CNN etc. that they are indeed the harbingers of a culture of global productivities, knowledges, pleasures. Again, it is doubtless true that a global informational regime is being constructed. But is one to celebrate this process as a globalized hybridity or to conceptualise it as the penetration of far-flung, globally dispersed households by uniform structures of imperialist ideology . . . ? (Ahmad 1995: 12)

Ahmad's general position can be aligned here with some of the views suspicious of the globalization process referred to earlier and, more

specifically, with the critical stance which we encountered in chapter 3, that reads cultural globalization through the lens of cultural imperialism and homogenization. Despite all the problems which we found with this position, it must be said that Ahmad does pose an important issue of power relations in cultural processes in his insistence that hegemonic structures must be accounted for in any theory of hybridity.

However, recognizing hegemonic structures does not necessarily lead to a rejection of the idea of hybridity out of hand. It is not really a choice between, on the one hand, the hybridity thesis in the simple form of anarchic, unregulated cultural flows creatively combining, or on the other, the 'incorporation' thesis in which cultural hegemons absorb and refigure all subaltern cultures in their own image and to their own ends. Rather as the Chicana writer and poet Gloria Anzaldua describes it, hybrid experience is one which escapes incorporation by remaining marginalized in a 'borderlands' which intrinsically, contradictorily, mixes pleasures and woes:

I am a border woman. . . . I have been straddling that *tejas*-Mexican border, and others, all my life. Its not a comfortable territory to live in, this place of contradictions. Hatred, anger and exploitation are the prominent features of this landscape. However, there have been compensations for this *mestiza*, and certain joys. Living on borders and in margins, keeping intact one's shifting and multiple identity and integrity, is like trying to swim in a new element. . . . There is an exhilaration in being a participant in the further evolution of mankind . . . (Anzaldua 1987: Preface, no page number).

Anzaldua's work centres on this ambiguity – the living of something new and exhilarating – indeed of being, in García Canclini's sense, in the vanguard of cultural development – within hegemonic structures that constantly 'marginalize' the mixtures they create. As she puts it in a stanza from her poem 'To live in the Borderlands means you':

To live in the Borderlands means to
Put *chile* in the borscht
eat wholewheat *tortillas*
speak Tex-Mex with a Brooklyn accent
be stopped by *la migra* at the border checkpoints
(Anzaldua 1987: 194)

Here the power of hegemonic forces is felt *within* a hybridity which is none the less experienced as having its own independent cultural

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power. So, as Nederveen Pieterse says, it is a question of recognizing how this complexity of hegemony-hybridity operates: 'Hence hybridity raises the question of the *terms* of mixture, the conditions of mixing and *mélange*. At the same time it's important to note the ways in which hegemony is not merely reproduced but *refigured* in the process of hybridization' (1995: 57). One way of thinking about this sort of 'refiguring' is to recognize that the movement of populations from the Third to the First World – the 'post-colonial diaspora' – has implications for the cultural identity of erstwhile imperialist nations. As Kevin Robins, puts it, this sort of deterritorialization represents a sense in which the 'Other has installed itself within the very heart of the western metropolis . . . [t]hrough a kind of reverse invasion, the periphery has now infiltrated the colonial core' (Robins 1991: 32). Thus, though we can agree with Ahmad that the creation of hybridity is never a power-neutral process, it does not necessarily proceed on a predictable trajectory reproducing the old hegemonies. Rather, as Robins reasons, the self-confident, stable cultural identity of the West may be becoming threatened: 'Through this irruption of empire, the certain and centred perspective of the old colonial order is confronted and confused' (1991: 33).

Drawing these thoughts together, we can conclude, at a minimum, that the idea of hybridization is a useful way of describing a substantive aspect of the process of deterritorialization. Some term is clearly needed to capture the general phenomenon of cultural mixing that is unquestionably increasing with the advance of globalization. Furthermore, the notion of hybrid cultures may be useful for grasping the sort of new cultural identifications that may be emerging – for example in youth culture built around popular music forms like 'hip-hop' (Gilroy 1993: 33ff) – in the 'transnational' cultural space. These complex transmutations of cultural practices and forms as they pass rapidly and effortlessly across national boundaries through the transnational cultural economy perhaps provide a figure for what a future 'globalized popular culture' may turn out to be like: different, that is, in *character* from the integrating, 'essentializing' nature of national cultures, looser-textured, more protean and relatively indifferent to the maintenance of sharp discriminations of cultural origin and belonging.

However the implications of hybridization as 'simple mixing' are not, as we have seen, straightforward, nor are the political positions to be drawn from it. It may be, for example, that a different term that does not trail behind it all the residual biologism of 'the hybrid' metaphor may be preferable. At any rate, it seems important that

the idea of hybridization is kept close to the broader analysis of culture change that is grasped in deterritorialization – and used circumspectly to identify *aspects* of this process – rather than being taken independently as a *general* description of the global cultural condition. Apart from anything else, this is important to avoid overstating the cultural flux of globalization and losing sight of the tendency of cultural mixtures to re-embed themselves, however briefly, into 'stable' identity positions. Including hybridization as a subsidiary concept to deterritorialization allows us the conceptual space to think through this tendency in the dialectically opposed category of reterritorialization.

And this thought brings me to the general conclusion of this chapter. What I have tried to describe in the idea of deterritorialization is something like a general cultural condition which proceeds from the spread of global modernity. No doubt there are other cultural implications of the process of globalization, but those that we have considered under the category of deterritorialization, I have tried to suggest, are centrally significant ones that touch most people in the world and transform their daily life experiences in radical ways. But in concluding, it is important to stress that deterritorialization is not a linear, one-way process, but one characterized by the same dialectical push-and-pull as globalization itself. Where there is deterritorialization there is also reterritorialization.

Although we have met with some examples of reterritorializing practices – for instance in García Canclini's description of Tijuana's claims to cultural ownership of their city – we have not generally stressed this aspect, since the purpose of the chapter was to focus on the forces that lift us out of our ties to place. But there are at least two good reasons to recognize the strength of this countervailing force. First, as we have stressed, the condition of deterritorialization is an ambiguous one that combines benefits with costs. Amongst the latter are the various existential vulnerabilities that come when our lives are opened up to the wider world and our sense of a secure and circumscribed home – both literally and metaphorically – is threatened. The drive towards reterritorialization can thus be seen in various attempts to re-establish a cultural 'home'. Amongst these there will be examples of very direct collective cultural-imaginative projects – for instance the creation by cultural diasporas of 'invented homelands' such as the Sikh diaspora's claims to 'Khalistan' (Appadurai 1990: 302; Cohen 1997: 106ff). But, more generally there are the numerous small, routine ways in which individual human subjects attempt, as Marshall Berman (1983: 348) says, to make

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themselves 'at home' in the world of global modernity, to live with its transformations and to generate new identities and narratives of personal meaning out of them. Secondly, there is the simple but important fact that we are all, as human beings, *embodied and physically located*. In this fundamental material sense the ties of culture to location can never be completely severed and the locality continues to exercise its claims upon us as the physical situation of our lifeworld. So deterritorialization cannot ultimately mean the end of locality, but its transformation into a more complex cultural space. Both of these aspects of the countervailing potential of reterritorialization will figure more significantly in the two chapters that follow.